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Abstract
Sustainability related issues, such as inequality, water security, and climate risk, repre-
sent a significant concern for many individuals and organizations, threatening the stability
of the world’s markets, including the financial markets. Meanwhile, the financial sector
developed strategies and products to improve social and environmental prosperity. Also,
financial regulators created incentives to promote sustainable practices. However, the ef-
fect of sustainable practices and regulations on the banks’ financial stability is unclear.
Literature evidences a research gap in studies linking financial stability and sustainable
finance practices and regulations. Additionally, the main theories that cover financial sta-
bility overlook the systemic risk that originated from climate and social sources. The main
objective of this thesis is to analyze the influence of sustainable finance regulations over the
financial stability of Latin America from 2008 to 2017. This research study uses the data
from 149 banks in 17 countries in Latin America form 2008 to 2018. The Zscore is used to
measure the levels of financial stability of the banks studied. These banks are divided into
two groups depending on the existence of sustainable banking regulations in the countries
they operate. Several quantitative methods are applied, including a two-mean difference
Welch t-test, a panel binary logit regression, a random-effects regression, and a dynamic
panel data regression using a two-step GMM model. Comparing banks operating in coun-
tries with and without sustainable banking regulations shows significant results. Banks
located in countries that have sustainable finance regulations present higher financial sta-
bility levels. This study concludes that sustainable finance regulations promote financial
stability as well as sustainable banking practices. Further research is needed to understand
the transition towards sustainable banking and impacts on systemic risk.
Key Words: Sustainable finance, sustainability development, sustainable finance regu-
lations, financial stability, dynamic panel analysis
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Resistance to economic shocks, asset price stability, and currency value and function
are some of the characteristics of a financially stable economy (Jiang et al., 2019). Banks
and financial institutions’ primary concern is their financial returns and the financial risk
attached to it (Weber, 2012). Financial stability and sustainable activities are significant
aspects that should be considered in the banking sector, though they tend to be overlooked.
In the last ten years, several countries in Latin America joined Brazil’s initiative to con-
sider sustainability in their financial regulations. This unprecedented trend has changed
financial institutions’ behaviour within the banking sector, creating incentives to develop
new environmental policies and products. However, how efficient have these policies been
in terms of financial stability? Are these measures headed towards a more resilient banking
system? These are essential questions that bankers and academics have tried to answer
since the 2007-2009 subprime mortgage crisis. This thesis aims to understand whether sus-
tainable finance regulations influence the financial stability of banks by comparing banks
that operate in countries with and without a sustainable regulatory framework in their
1
financial market.
This master thesis looks into the banking system in Latin America and analyzes the
financial stability of 149 banks in 17 Latin American countries to understand how it is
affected by sustainable finance regulations. This study uses several quantitative analytical
methods to understand the relationship between environmental regulations in the financial
sector and banking stability, including a Welch t-test, a logit panel regression, a fixed
effect regression, and a 2-step generalized method of moments (GMM) panel regression.
The results of this thesis green regulations in the financial sector have a positive impact
on the bank’s financial stability.
The remainder of this chapter will introduce basic concepts regarding financial stability
and sustainable finance, as well as summarize the main sustainable finance regulations in
Latin America. The problem statement later addressed in the chapter, followed by the
research objectives.
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1.1 Financial Stability
Financial stability refers to a healthy financial system, though it has different applica-
tions in finance, and it is hard to define. Central banks, financial institutions, and other
financial entities frequently use their definition of financial stability (Stefaniak, 2019). How-
ever, for Schinasi (2004), “a financial system is in a range of stability whenever it is capable
of facilitating (rather than impeding) the performance of an economy, and of dissipating
financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as a result of significant adverse and unan-
ticipated events” (pp.8). This definition implies that financial stability is an ever-changing
state of the financial system, handling internal and external shocks form the economy to
contribute towards its performance.
Other authors refer to financial stability by using its counterpart, financial crisis or
instability. This perspective is a consequence of several unstable episodes of the financial
markets throughout history, which motivated researchers from several fields into numerous
investigations about the phenomenon of financial instability. However, in terms of policy-
making, evaluation, and economic development, considering financial stability as a policy
objective is more efficient (Schinasi, 2004). Although the definition of financial stability
is somehow ambiguous, it is generally agreed to be a common main goal of every central
bank and country in the world, as it promotes the economies on a multidimensional level
(Schinasi, 2004).
Furthermore, systemic risk is one of the main concerns of financial institutions when
considering financial stability. Systemic risk consists of the externality that surges as
a consequence of a financial institution’s failure, which has the potential to replicate in
other financial institutions (Acharya et al., 2017). To avoid this risk, central banks and
governments implement macroprudential policies (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, nd). The main
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objective of macroprudential policies is to prevent “the macroeconomic costs of systemic
financial distress, taking into account feedback effects that the behaviour of individual
financial institutions have on each other, and on the whole economy” (Galati and Moessner,
2013, pp. 864). Additionally, financial institutions need to internalize the cost of creating
systemic risk, or else they will be encouraged to create more risk in the financial sector
(Acharya et al., 2017).
A stable financial system is of paramount importance for ensuring a healthy economy.
An economy with a stable financial system copes with economic shocks, provides asset
price stability, and incorporates currency value and function (Jiang et al., 2019). Addi-
tionally, a stable financial system helps the economy to manage financial risk, maintain
low unemployment levels, and allocate resources and assets efficiently (World Bank, 2012).
In other words, a stable financial system is essential since it provides a range of gains for
financial institutions and all stakeholders. Additionally, episodes of financial instability or
crisis have shown the importance of maintaining a secure and reliable financial market.
1.2 Sustainable Finance
Sustainable finance can be defined as a branch or an alternative of traditional finance
that integrates economic, social and environmental into financial analysis and decisions.
Sustainable finance introduces practices that reduce negative impacts on the environment
and society, such as pollution emission reduction, and adapts the economy to avoid fu-
ture environmental consequences (Wang and Zhi, 2016). Additionally, it concentrates on
keeping the welfare of future generations, while still meeting current needs (Dyllick and
Hockerts, 2002; Schaltegger and Burritt, 2005; Busch et al., 2016; Weber and Feltmate,
2016).
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Sustainable finance introduces environmental and social versions of traditional financial
products in the industry. For instance, sustainable loans help people finance projects and
help the economy grow while keeping a moral code to follow regarding environmental,
social, and economic impacts (Weber and Feltmate, 2016). Investor and portfolio managers
have access to other financial products, like bonds, funds, or stocks. If they value green
policies, adopting them can increase the stock market value of those assets (Schmalensee,
2012). These financial activities are also referred as impact investing. Furthermore, if
the case is project finance, the Equator Principles provide a set of rules or principles
that financial institutions should follow to reduce the environmental and social impact
of significant investments (Weber and Feltmate, 2016). The ultimate goal of sustainable
finance is to reach sustainable development, which, basically consists of committing to
reach a more equitable and healthier world for future generations (Keeble, 1988).
1.3 Sustainability Initiatives in the Financial Sector
To promote sustainable practice in the banking sector, different organizations have
created guidelines, regulations, and other initiatives. The following section provides a brief
description of the leading international and regional sustainable finance initiatives.
The pursue of sustainable development has inspired different organizations to take the
initiative and introduce sustainability frameworks into the financial sector. The list of
the initiatives includes international regulations led by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), regional and national initiatives.
International guidelines and regulations for sustainable finance have an essential role
in the transformation of the financial sector towards sustainability.
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Some initiatives bring together academics and experts in sustainability and finance to
develop sustainability in the financial markets. Some of these organizations include:
• The Corporate Forum on Sustainable Finance,
• The Global Green Finance Council (GGFC),
• Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS),
• Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD),
• G20 Sustainable Finance Study Group,
• and the Sustainable Banking Network (SBN).
Other initiatives provide frameworks and guidelines for financial institutions in the
pursuit of financial projects and products, like the Loan Principles (GLP & SLLP), the
Equators Principles, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
1.4 Sustainable Finance Practices and Regulations in
Latin America
Latin America consists of the continental area conformed by 26 countries distributed in
the South, Central and North American continent, and the Caribbean islands. This study
will focus on 18 countries from the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
6
During the last 20 years, Latin America has seen notable improvement. Several coun-
tries in this region have exhibited a degree of macroeconomic stability, probably never seen
since they were founded as independent nations (Bittencourt, 2012). Indeed, 16 of the
economies mentioned above of the region have managed to sustain one-digit inflation rates
with stable growth rates in the established study period (2008-2018).
Some Latin American countries have taken the initiative to create a sustainable legal
framework (Oyegunle and Weber, 2015). These regulations include practicing environ-
mental and social risk management, support project finance, and other aspects regarding
sustainability in the financial sector. As a result, the creation of financial products like
green bonds has been increasing in Latin America. Consequently, from 2014 to 2017, there
were 26 green bonds issued, which stands for $8.4 billion in the region (ECLAC, 2017).
However, these bonds seem to represent only 1.6% on average of the total bonds issued in
the region.
Below are named and briefly described the key policies in Latin American countries
mitigate environmental and social risks in the financial sector:
1.4.1 Brazil
Brazil was the first country in Latin America to commit the financial sector to develop
sustainable practices. The sustainable regulations on the financial sector consist of the
Green Protocol (Protocolo Verde in Portuguese) and six regulations later introduced.
The introduction of the social and environmental framework into the banking system
started in 1995 with the Green Protocol to stand up to environmental and social challenges
that jeopardized water resources, preservation of biodiversity, sustainable management of
forest, human labor rights, diversity and local culture (Ministerio do Meio Ambiente, 1995).
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The initiative resulted from the action of five banks, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvi-
mento Economico e Social (BNDES), Caixa Econoˆmica Federal (Caixa), Banco Do Brasil,
Banco Da Amazoˆnia, and Banco do Nordeste do Brasil in partnership with Brazil’s Min-
istry of Environment (Ministerio do Meio Ambiente in Portuguese). Later, four resolutions
were introduced by the Brazilian National Monetary Council (Conselho Monet’ario Na-
cional in Portuguese) to address environmental, social, and governance issues in the sector:
Resolution N° 3,545 (2008) regarding the protection of the Amazon biome; Resolution N°
3,813 (2009) for Sugarcane investment, regulation N° 3,876 (2010) for Slave labor, and Res-
olution N° 3,547 (2011) to ensure governance and risk management by an internal capital
adequacy assessment process (International Finance Corporation, 2018).
Two more resolutions created regarding environmental and social responsibility for fi-
nancial institutions. In 2014, the Central Bank of Brazil introduced the Resolution N.4,327
detailing the principles to create good practices that mitigate environmental and social
risks (2014). Additionally, Resolution N.4,557 follows up the last one in 2017, requir-
ing financial institutions to create structures for capital and risk management, including
socio-environmental risks.
1.4.2 Colombia
The financial regulations to promote sustainability in the Colombian financial sector
started with the Green Protocol (Protocolo Verde in Spanish) on June 7 th, 2012, signed by
the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development and ASOBANCARIA (Banking
Association). The protocol started thanks to the voluntary initiative of said institutions.
It consists of voluntary guidelines to cope with ESG issues that financial institutions can
practice as tools to implement projects and further risk management analysis and ecoeffi-
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ciency, including loan and investment programs. Later, the protocol was followed in 2017
by General Guidelines for the Implementation of Environmental and Social Risk Analy-
sis, a complimentary that guided banks towards the correct implementation of the Green
Protocol.
Initially, 12 banks signed the document voluntarily, and so far, 22 banks have signed the
protocol, and 11 have implemented the environmental and social risk management system
(International Finance Corporation, 2018)
1.4.3 Ecuador
The financial market in Ecuador joined the sustainable initiative thanks to the na-
tion’s Banking Association (ASOBANCARIA) in 2016 with the implementation of the
Sustainable Banking Protocol (Protocolo de Banca Sustentable in Spanish). This protocol
provides the signing parties with voluntary strategies to promote investment that encourage
sustainable practices and sustainable internal controls within signing financial institutions
and create investment and credit risk assessment methods that include environmental and
social risks (ASOBANCARIA, 2016). Being a signing member of the protocol is voluntary,
and ten commercial banks initially signed it, with now 13 signing financial institutions.
1.4.4 Mexico
Mexico’s sustainable regulations in the banking system consist of two key policy docu-
ments: The Bank’s Sustainability Protocol (Protocolo de Sustentabilidad de la Banca in
Spanish) and the Green Bond Principles MX. First, the Bank’s Sustainability Protocol,
launched by the Banking Mexico Association (ABM) in 2016. The protocol, signed by 18
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commercial banks and five development institutions, declares the global challenges that
climate change represents and the Mexican commitment to face them. This document
incorporates five strategic principles to reach its objectives: internal sustainability poli-
cies institutionalization, environmental and social risks management in the investment and
credit processes; sustainable investment; efficient use of resources in internal processes; and
monitoring and dissemination of the guild’s sustainability practices and policies. Second,
the Green Bond Principles MX was published in 2018 by the Climate Finance
Advisory Group (CCFC, in Spanish). The principles consist of a set of requirements
for Mexican green bond issuers to provide them guidance during the green bond issuance
process. These guidelines include the use of proceeds from the issuance, evaluation, and
project selection process, emission proceeds management, annual reporting, and external
evaluation and review (CCFC, 2018).
1.4.5 Panama
Panama’s effort to create a sustainable finance market stated by joining the Sustainable
Banking Network (SBN) in January 2018. Later, the publication of Panama’s Sustainable
Finance Protocol (Protocolo de Finanzas Sustentables de Panama’ in Spanish) was pub-
lished in July 2018 by the Sustainable Committee of the Panama Banking Association
(ABP or Asociacion Bancaria de Panama in Spanish). The protocol intends to improve
the financial sector in terms of competitivity, reputation, risk reduction, market diversifica-
tion, and sustainable development. Additionally, the document highlights the importance
of creating and disclosing all green finance products, including green bonds, credit cards,
green lines of credit, and others. Initially, sixteen commercial banks signed the docu-
ment. Other actions taken by the ABP include training and workshops regarding green
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finance products. Furthermore, the efforts to sign and follow the protocol voluntary; thus,
there is no supervision enforced nor financial or non-financial incentives for banks from the
government to join the protocol.
1.4.6 Peru
The development of the environmental regulations in the Peruvian financial sector
started with the initiative of the Superintendence of Banking and Insurance (SBS or Su-
perintendencia de Bancos, Seguros y AFP in Spanish) in 2015 with the approval of the
Resolution N. 1928-2015: Regulation for Social and Environmental Risk Management; and
the Document SBS N. 01-2015: The role of enhanced due diligence in the regulation of
socioenvironmental risk management for financial firms.
The first establishes the minimum requirements regarding social and environmental risk
management. It highlights specific steps that financial institutions need to mitigate social
and environmental risks from loans and credits provided, as well as the procedures and
formats for quarterly reports of the institution. The second document published comple-
ments and describes the regulation mentioned above. It objectively clarifies the role of each
institution, group of people, and entity to provide better guidance for the compliance of
the regulation. Besides, it summarizes relevant international sustainable finance norms to
banks within the country, including the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, ISO26000, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, IFC Performance
Standards, Equator Principles, and UN Principles for Responsible Investment.
Following this regulation, the SBS published in 2018 a Green Bonds Guidelines for
Peru (Gu’ıa de Bonos Verdes para el Peru’ in Spanish), a guide created to develop the
green bonds market in Peru. Additionally, this guideline provides a step by step process
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recommended by the SBS on how to create and emit a green bond. It details the complete
process, including the creation, evaluation process, bond emission, and disclosure.
1.5 Problem Statement
The effect of sustainable finance regulations on financial stability has both practical and
theoretical implications. The application of sustainable finance regulations has a potential
to influence significantly in economies, providing the conditions for it to develop from
economic and sustainability perspectives.
Financial stability is a necessary condition that economies should maintain to pursue
sustainable and economic development (Schinasi, 2004). With a stable financial sector,
an economy is prepared to absorb adverse economic shocks, reducing the damage in the
economy and society (Jiang et al., 2019). Maintaining financial stability and reducing
systemic risk is critical for a country to develop sustainability.
In the literature on financial stability, several studies have shown the importance of a
stable financial sector (Kasman and Carvallo, 2014; Barth et al., 2013), the role of financial
institutions (Tabak et al., 2013; Shehzad and De Haan, 2015), regulations (Agoraki et al.,
2011; Barth et al., 2013; Allen and Gu, 2018; Bermpei et al., 2018), and central banks and
policymakers (Acharya, 2009). However, researchers tend to overlook the effects of climate
and social risks over financial stability.
Meanwhile, sustainable finance introduces sustainable practices into the financial sector,
providing a range of economic benefits to both financial institutions and the economy in
general. Some of these benefits include risk reduction (Weber, 2017), higher performance
(Dam and Scholtens, 2015), and economic development. Consequently, some governments
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include regulations in their financial system that enforce sustainable behaviour from firms
in the financial sector (Zadek and Robins, 2016), which has led towards benefits in terms
of social, economic, and environmental impacts (Weber, 2017). Between 2008 and 2018,
six countries in Latin America, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru,
included sustainable regulations in their financial systems. These policies have helped
banks to adopt sustainable practices in their organizational culture and business practices
(Oyegunle and Weber, 2015; Weber and Oni, 2015).
Furthermore, as sustainable finance has grown in the financial sector, more opportu-
nities for research have shown significant impacts on the introduction of green finance on
banks’ financial performance (Dam and Scholtens, 2015; Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018).
Countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, have been applying strict environmental poli-
cies from 2008, 2012, and 2016, respectively. This shift in the regulatory background of
the region in the financial sector provides a significant sample to study and compare the
stability with other countries. However, research that covers financial practice in the Latin
American region is scarce.
The literature overlooks the connection between sustainability and financial stability,
or when attempts to connect sustainability with financial stability, lacks sustainability per-
spective, only relying on traditional monetary and macroprudential policies (Jiang et al.,
2019). To gain a fuller understanding of the effects of sustainable regulations in the bank-
ing sector on financial stability, quantitative research that provides significant empirical
evidence is required. Focusing on sustainable banking and finance stability can help de-
velop robust theories of financial stability and how it is affected by the banks’ level of
sustainability, as well as potentially informing future policy objectives.
This thesis aims to better understand the macroprudential implications of sustainable
finance regulations. The sustainable regulations in the financial industry will be analyzed,
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and data from 149 banks will be gathered and analyzed. This thesis will use quantitative
methods to contrast the stability of banks in countries with and without sustainable finance
regulations between 2008 and 2018. This data will be analyzed using panel data statistical
analysis such as logit regression, fixed effect panel data analysis, and dynamic panel data
analysis.
1.6 Research Question and Objectives
This study aims to answer the following research question:
What is the influence of sustainable finance regulations on the financial stability of Latin
America?
Therefore, the general objective of this thesis is to analyze the influence of sustainable
finance regulations over the financial stability of Latin America from 2008 to 2017.
Additionally, to reach this objective, it has been broken down into three more specific
objectives, which are:
1. Investigate the existence sustainable regulations in the banking system on Latin
American countries by reviewing the banking regulatory framework in the region.
2. Create a database of macroeconomic, sustainability, and financial indicators for the
leading banks of the countries in the region.
3. Develop a quantitative model that includes institutional, macroeconomic, and sus-
tainable data to understand whether sustainable banking regulations and practices
have a significant impact on Latin American financial stability in the financial sector.
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The rest of this master thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 consists of a review
of the literature of sustainable finance, financial stability, financial regulations, and their
linkage. The methodology and methods that will be applied to analyze the data will be
explained in Chapter 3, followed by the results section in Chapter 4. Furthermore, Chapter
5 presents a discussion of those results. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the concluding remarks
of the thesis, followed by the bibliography used in the study.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The following sections describe the primary literature on financial stability, sustainable
finance, the effects of sustainable finance over banking risk and financial stability, and both
sustainable and traditional sustainable regulations as macroprudential policies.
This chapter’s objective is to provide an argument for sustainable finance regulations
as an evident and necessary macroprudential policy based on literature. The chapter
explains the increasing challenges of sustainability-related financial risks and the potential
for sustainable finance to diminish this systemic risk.
Additionally, the chapter introduces the main theories that explain systemic risk sources
and the primary regulations used to avoid episodes of financial instability. Finally, this
chapter presents the central hypothesis of the thesis and the literature gap evidenced in
the literature review.
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2.1 Sustainability and Financial Stability
Literature linking sustainability and financial stability approaches to the later as a con-
sequence of the success or failure of adapting sustainable processes into current systems
(Ryszanka, 2016; Battiston et al., 2017; Cui et al., 2018). Financial institutions and schol-
ars agree that to develop sustainability, it is crucial to face specific challenges, such as
climate change, water security, air pollution, and others, which can materialize into exter-
nal shocks and sources of systemic risk (Ryszanka, 2016). Therefore, markets’ timing and
ability to respond to said shocks (Battiston et al., 2017) are crucial to preserving financial
stability. Experts believe that financial stability will increase over time as sustainabil-
ity develops within the financial markets, given the social, environmental, and economic
benefits that sustainable development provides to the market (Cui et al., 2018).
Other studies have shown the detrimental implications that arise from high climate risk
over the financial system (Skidmore, 2001; Klomp, 2014; Dietz et al., 2016; Scott et al.,
2017) as well as the systemic risk that it carries (Rozenberg et al., 2013; Campiglio et al.,
2018; Dietz et al., 2016). The size and scope of climate-related catastrophes, development
level of the financial markets, and acerbity of financial regulations play a crucial factor
when determining the impacts of a natural disaster on a country’s financial system (Klomp,
2014). Climate change and the respective social response also creates a detrimental effect
represented in transitional and physical risks to the financial industry, which has a direct
negative impact on the bank’s objectives (Scott et al., 2017).
These repercussions include a substantial threat to the liquidity (Klomp, 2014), re-
duction in asset value (Dietz et al., 2016), as well as an increased rate of non-performing
loans, higher portfolio allocation, economic activity, and, consequentially, bank system and
systemic stability. Households are potentially affected on account of the high exposure of
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pension funds and pension schemes to climate risk (Monasterolo et al., 2017). Addition-
ally, there is a positive correlation between household savings rates and damages caused
by natural disasters (Skidmore, 2001). Overall, climate-related effects degrade financial
stability, and the efficiency of economic policies is minimal as soon as the damages of cli-
mate change start to impact the economy (Dafermos et al., 2018). However, turning into
a socially responsible investment could help funds to outperform during a market crisis
period (Nofsinger and Varma, 2014).
The objective of shifting towards sustainable development interplays with the possibil-
ities of a future financial crisis. Carbon externalities should be a component of the broader
reflection on the sustainability of public and private debts and the related pressure on cur-
rent consumption levels (Rozenberg et al., 2013). Thus, societies need to avoid excessive
economic losses and keep their financial system stability (Campiglio et al., 2018) while
shifting to a low-carbon economy or face the irreversible economic consequences of climate
change and natural disasters (Dietz et al., 2016). Hence, policymakers should create incen-
tives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions targeting the main susceptible sectors to climate
risk (Monasterolo et al., 2017)
2.2 Sustainable Finance
The literature of sustainable finance has developed in different areas, including financial
performance, sustainability performance, and banking risk. The term sustainable finance
combines both financial services and the need to reach the needs of current societies with-
out compromising future generations (Soppe, 2004), which differs from traditional finance
theories.
Sustainable finance shows benefits for financial institutions regarding their performance.
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Sustainable practices in financial institutions have shown a relationship with the organi-
zations’ financial performance (Dam and Scholtens, 2015). Studies have found theoretical
foundations that CSR and corporate performance of institutions have a positive correla-
tion (Dam and Scholtens, 2015). Simulations show that green public policies can promote
green growth by influencing firms’ expectations and the credit market. Green sovereign
bonds represent a short-term win-win solution, while green fiscal measures have higher
immediate distributive effects that induce negative feedback on the economy (Monasterolo
and Raberto, 2018)
Furthermore, environmental risks have come to the attention of most financial institu-
tions and central banks. Research suggests that modern finance is transitioning towards
sustainability due to external shock, such as climate change, water insecurity, low carbon
markets, and the creation of new financial products and incentives (Weber, 2005; Ryszanka,
2016). Furthermore, financial institutions’ disclosure of sustainable measures and practices,
specifically environmental impacts and sustainable development, is critical (Weber, 2012).
However, it is as essential to provide transparency to said reports, and indicators such as
loan applications being assessed by environmental credit risk indicators compared to all
loan applications (Weber, 2012). Hence, the financial activities detrimental to both the
environment and society create risks for the institution (Cui et al., 2018) can decrease
through the adoption of positive environmental activities.
The presence of environmental and social aspects in credit risk management is promi-
nent in the literature, especially the effects it has on its performance. Investors, therefore,
increasingly demand that firms assess and disclose their management of environmental is-
sues (Bauer and Hann, 2012). Financial service institutions have a duty regarding direct
and indirect impacts reporting on the environment and sustainable development (Weber,
2012). Displaying detrimental behaviours to the environment, and society increases mate-
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rial risks, and reducing such behaviour decreases said risk (Cui et al., 2018). Additionally,
institutions engaged proactively with environmental issues and development possess a lower
cost of debt charge, and there is evidence on a weak link to higher credit ratings (Bauer
and Hann, 2012).
2.3 Banking Regulations and Financial Stability
Policymakers mainly use regulations in the financial sector to guarantee the financial
stability of the industry through adjusted limiting financial capital provision and financial
risk (Acharya, 2009). Studies recommend creating incentives in the banking sector, such
as prudential regulations and supervision, to develop institutional bank stability (Anginer
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2014). Prudential regulations and supervision over banks have shown
higher quality loans and lower moral hazard (Shehzad and De Haan, 2015), as well as
limiting the engagement of banks in non-interest income activities (Bermpei et al., 2018)
and systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2017). However, other studies have shown concern
towards financial institutions too big to fail; the 2007-2009 subprime crisis evidenced the
risk that these companies represent. Their expectations of being partially restored by
economic authorities in case of a crisis (Tabak et al., 2013) compromises the stability of
the global financial system. Hence, regulatory reviews of potential stake-holders agency
problems and internal governance are irrelevant, especially for more prominent financial
institutions (Kasman and Carvallo, 2014) to minimize the chances of financial crisis given
their larger size, complexity, and systemic importance.
The financial system’s regulatory framework shows a change in the behaviour of finan-
cial institutions regarding risk management. Regulations that incorporate capital require-
ments and supervisory power reduce non-preforming loans and, as a consequence, credit
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risk (Agoraki et al., 2011). Some financial institutions tend to be cautious of possible fi-
nancial implications and financial uncertainties that come from financial regulations (Dam
and Scholtens, 2015). These findings and the change of behaviours in the industry have
increased the popularity of financial regulations (Barth et al., 2013).
Furthermore, regulatory effectiveness has a secure link with a country’s institutional
quality. Regulations in countries with weak democratic institutions are associated with
higher corruption in the lending process with no similar beneficial effects on stability (Barth
et al., 2013). Also, regulations alone have no control over financial crises; policymakers
must consider other mechanisms, as well as preventive measures, should be considered at
the institutional level (Allen and Gu, 2018). Hence, political stability is essential to in-
crease the benefits of capital regulations and activities restrictions over the bank’s stability
and developing economies would benefit from capital regulation and special monitoring
in terms of bank stability (Bermpei et al., 2018). However, researchers should consider
environmental stability and sustainable practice when evaluating future financial crises.
2.4 Financial Stability and Sustainable Finance Reg-
ulations
The amount of existing literature that evaluates climate change’s repercussion on finan-
cial stability is scarce since most of it bases on the effects on financial performance. (Weber
et al., 2015; Dam and Scholtens, 2015; Weber, 2017; Cui et al., 2018) It is imperative to
adopt the necessary measures to protect a nation’s economic and financial stability regard-
ing climate change adaptation since they will define the level of exposure of the financial
markets (Battiston et al., 2017).
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Regulatory standards also play an essential part in the application of sustainable prac-
tices inside the financial markets. Nowadays, financial markets are vigilant of the usually
uncertain financial implications that result from environmental regulatory interventions as
the demands for stricter environmental regulations increase (Bauer and Hann, 2012). Cen-
tral Banks and governments implement these regulations in the hope that environmental
policies increase financial stability and economic development, as well as enhancing finan-
cial and environmental performance (Weber, 2017). Policies such as green credit policies
can increase an institution’s corporate sustainability and create a more stable and prof-
itable financial sector (Weber, 2017). For instance, several countries, like China, Brazil,
and Bangladesh, have adopted environmental regulations in their financial sector to reduce
the carbon footprint of the country banks’ portfolios (Zadek and Robins, 2016). The ERM
Guidelines in Bangladesh evidenced that sustainability criteria can predict credit losses of
banks in developing countries (Weber et al., 2015). Additionally, the Green Credit Pol-
icy in China addresses both environment and financial performance, creating institutional
pressure on the Chinese Financial system (Cui et al., 2018).
Banks in countries that enforce environmental legislation engage in more corporate
social responsibility (CSR) activities, and self-regulation in the financial industry has a
significantly positive effect on CSR (Chih et al., 2010).
The relevant politics of green finance can ease the financing bottleneck that the gov-
ernment faces to some degree combined with reform and innovative financial tools. The
policies include two aspects: first, the reform and innovation of existing financial tools, an
exploration of the type of fiscal policy and the feasible way to raise money for green finance
development; second, the reform of existing fiscal revenue management and distribution
policy, namely the efficiency and direction in the use of monetary funds (Wang and Zhi,
2016).
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2.5 Identification of Gaps in the literature
The literature review of sustainable finance, its regulations, and financial stability ev-
idence gaps and future research opportunities. Several studies have shown the effects
of regulations on financial stability. These studies show that legislation and supervisory
power enhance the capacity of a bank to provide financial stability. Similarly, the liter-
ature section dedicated to sustainable finance regulations evidences the benefits of ESG
criteria and a potential increase in financial performance. Despite this, little progress has
been made towards incorporating environmental and sustainable frameworks that ana-
lyze climate change macro-financial impacts (Campiglio et al., 2018). Stability, from a
macroeconomic perspective, is crucial to make a financial push to the economy (Bitten-
court, 2012). Unfortunately, there are little incentives from the private sector to move
towards sustainable alternatives that could arise from stringent climate policies, given the
constant delay of policy acts as a result of uncertainty and disagreement regarding climate
change-related policies (Mercure et al., 2016). On the other hand, despite these recent
findings of the role of environmental regulatory standards on financial performance, more
research is needed to analyze the effect of sustainable finance policy on the financial sector
sustainability (Weber, 2017). Finally, this literature review provides evidence of the little
amount of financial and economic research in Latin America that evaluates the relationship
between sustainable development and financial stability.
2.6 Theoretical Framework
Two theories stand out in the literature that attempts to explain systemic risk and the
implications of economic policies on a country’s financial stability.
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The theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation describes systemic
risk and the importance of a regulatory figure to create policies that avoid systemic risk.
This theory, introduced by Acharya (2009), ”incorporates the likelihood of default by
banks on deposits, financial externalities from the failure of one bank on other banks,
regulatory incentives, and the interaction of these features” (pp. 228). This theory includes
a normative and a systemic feature. The positive component of the theory defines systemic
risks and its equilibrium. Meanwhile, the normative component designs regulations to
alleviate inefficient systemic risk (Acharya, 2009).
The theory, within its positive feature, models the concept of systemic risk-shifting, the
choice of correlation across assets between different banks given the existence of limited
liability and a negative externality of default by banks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981; Acharya, 2009; Acharya et al., 2017). In other words, banks decide to
invest in the same assets to reduce the effects of negative externalities (Benoit et al., 2017).
The firms’ lack of liability nullifies the limits of correlation that banks would compromise
as they prefer to survive with the crisis, as they benefit from this correlation thanks to
bailouts (Farhi and Tirole, 2012). Furthermore, the theory explains specific regulations
that should be avoided (Farhi and Tirole, 2012). It describes a regulatory framework that
includes a bank closure policy and capital requirements to reduce the chances of a massive
bank bailout scenario (Acharya, 2009), liquidity requirement or, equivalently, of a cap on
short-term debt (Farhi and Tirole, 2012).
Another important source of systematic risk is the tail risk, which has increased as a
source of risk capable of creating contagion and amplification effects since the introduction
of new capital requirements of Basel III (Benoit et al., 2017). These capital requirements
are creating incentives for banks to substitute reasonable risk with tail risk, which is not
considered in the regulatory framework. The increase towards tail risk provides lower
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losses for financial institutions in the short term, but the adverse effects are significant on
a financial crisis scenario. Studies show that banks’ inclination towards tail risk instead
of regular risk diminishes the benefits of capital requirements during periods of economic
instability (Perotti et al., 2011). Also, there is a significant influence from securitization
activities on tail risk. These activities increase exposure to tail risks through contracts
between intermediaries that would improve welfare. The significant amount of contracts
that securitization facilitates makes the banking system fragile during economic crises
(Gennaioli et al., 2013).
2.7 Hypothesis
Considering the research gap evidenced on topics and theories that link sustainable
finance regulations and financial stability in the literature review, this study evaluates the
following hypothesis:
• Ho: The existence of sustainable finance regulations has no significant effect on the
financial stability of banks in Latin America.
• H1: The existence of sustainable finance regulations has a significant effect on the
financial stability of banks in Latin America
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Chapter 3
Methods
The following section explains the methods used in this study, including data manipu-
lation and quantitative analysis. Regarding manipulation, first, it describes the proposed
type of investigation and research approach. Furthermore, it explains the data gathering
process, data source, and data cleaning, as well as the use of the Zscore as a measure of
financial stability and the control variables used in the model.
The quantitative methods section consists of several statistical tests and analyses that
evaluate the relationship between financial stability and sustainable finance regulations.
Initially, the Welch t-test examines the mean difference of the Zscore of banks in coun-
tries with different policies. Furthermore, this section introduces the following panel data
regression models: a binary logistic model, a random-effects model, and a dynamic panel
data analysis using a two-steps generalized method of moments. This methodology aims
to find the effect of sustainable finance regulations on financial stability.
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3.1 Proposed Type of Investigation and Research Ap-
proach
This thesis consists of a quantitative correlational analysis using archival data. The
study uses a quantitative approach to create generalizable knowledge about the effects of
sustainable finance regulations in the bank’s financial stability. This research adopts a
causal-comparative since: it compares two groups of banks, categorizing them by consider-
ing if they function in countries with or without sustainable finance regulations. Moreover,
the study uses secondary archival data from different organizational and national sources
and databases.
This research aims to understand whether sustainable regulations in the financial sec-
tor have a positive impact on a country’s and bank’s financial stability has, taking into
consideration several determinants of bank stability. This study assesses 149 banks in 18
different countries located in the Latin American region using a quantitative approach.
This research will assess and identify banks’ financial stability and the Latin American
region using a quantitative approach.
3.2 Data
The following subsection describes the data used in this research, as well as the pri-
mary sources. The sample data for this study consists of an unbalanced panel data of 149
banks from a broad international data set from 18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mex-
ico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The time frame of
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this study is from 2008 to 2018. Therefore, this study uses 1240 cross-sectional segments
(see Table 3.1).
The data collection of the bank-level variables consisted of a mixture of manual compi-
lation from the bank’s annuals and consolidated financial statements, mainly the Balance
Sheet and Income Statements. The bank-level variables gathered were total assets, total
liabilities, total loans, and total income after taxes. Additionally, the data analysis process
includes financial and macroeconomic variables as control variables. These indicators are
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Inflation (using the GDP deflator). This obtained
through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database.
The data were cleaned, modified, and processed using Microsoft Excel. Additional
calculations were needed to proceed to the final data analysis, such as the Zscores, the
return of assets (ROA), the equity-to-assets ratio, and the loan loss provision to total loan
ratio. Finally, the software used to analyze the statistical models was Gretl, statistics and
econometric software.
3.2.1 Measuring financial stability
The indicator that will be employed to measure the level of financial stability for every
bank every year is the Zscore. This indicator is prevalent in empirical studies to determine
the level of a bank’s financial stability (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Beck et al., 2007; Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Cˇiha´k and Hesse, 2010; Bermpei et al., 2018).
It represents the value that measures the solvency risk of a bank by relating its capital
level to the variability in its returns, or “the number of standard deviations that a bank’s
return on assets has to fall for the bank to become insolvent (Anginer and Demirguc-Kunt,
2014, pp.628). Hence, the Zscore is defined as:
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Table 3.1: Data Coverage
Row Labels Count of Bank Number of Observations
Argentina 12 102
Bolivia 10 68
Brazil 10 100
Chile 10 101
Colombia 10 85
Costa Rica 10 102
Dominican Republic 10 59
Ecuador 4 32
Guatemala 9 37
Honduras 10 61
Mexico 9 99
Panama 10 102
Paraguay 10 82
Peru 10 109
Puerto Rico 2 19
Uruguay 7 34
Venezuela 6 48
Grand Total 149 1240
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Zi =
ROA+ EA
σROA
(3.1)
Where, Zit stands for the Zscore of the bank i in the year t, ROAit stands for the
return of assets of the bank i in the year t, EA stands for equity-to-assets ratio of the bank
i in the year t, and σ(ROA)it stands for the standard deviation of return of assets of the
bank i in the year t. The ROAit is calculated by dividing the net income of a bank i by
its total assets after taxes. Furthermore, EAit consists of the ratio obtained when dividing
a bank’s total shareholder equity by its total assets. Finally, to calculate σ(ROA)it while
avoiding disturbances or bias given by the time-frame used, this study will use three-year
rolling time windows following the methodology from previous research (Bermpei et al.,
2018). The natural logarithm of the Zscored will be used in order to reduce variances in
the indicator’s value.
3.2.2 Sustainable Finance Regulations as a Dichotomic Variable
This study will use a categorical dichotomic (dummy) variable to compare banks that
are countries with and without sustainable finance regulations. The sustainable regulations
dichotomic variable shows the existence of regulatory legislation that promotes sustainable
financial activities. The values for these variables are either 1 or 0, depending on the
existence or nonexistence of regulations, respectively. Data regarding the existence of
sustainability-related regulations over the banking sector in each country will be gathered
manually through a review of each country’s banking regulations.
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3.2.3 Control Variables
Several control variables are used further in the research to smooth exogenous effects
that could affect the dependent variable. All the control variables are continuous variables
that represent ratios of either financial or macroeconomic data. Hence, macroeconomic
and bank level factors affect bank stability; therefore, bank and country specific control
variables are used in this study.
The bank level control variables used in this research will be the equity to asset ratio,
total asset growth, capital to asset ratio, Return on Assets (ROA), loan loss provision to
loan loss ratio. The equity to asset ratio is measured by the ratio of the total equity to total
assets, and it represents the bank’s capitalization, which is expected to have a neutralizing
effect on the bank risk-capital regulation nexus (Acharya et al., 2017; Delis et al., 2012).
The total asset growth to control bank growth and its relation to higher risk (Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Bermpei et al., 2018), measured by the subtraction of a bank’s
total assets and the value for that variable the previous year. Loan loss provision to total
loss ratio will be used as a proxy of the bank’s loans, calculated by the ratio of the bank’s
loan-loss provision to the total loans. All the values from the bank level control variables
were calculated after the data collection from each bank’s financial statements.
The macroeconomic control variables are the growth of the gross domestic product
(GDP growth) and the inflation rate. GDP growth will cover the effect of economic condi-
tions, calculated by the subtraction of the gross domestic product of a country in a specific
year with the value of that variable the previous year and finally divided by the GDP of
the previous year. The inflation rate embodies a proxy for monetary conditions, using
the GDP deflator. The values for these indicators were collected from the database of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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3.3 Empirical Methods
The following subsection will explain the empirical methods applied in this thesis. In
total, four empirical tests were applied during the development of this thesis to provide a
robust analysis. First, a Welch T-test was used in order to check the mean difference of the
Zscore between countries with and without sustainable finance regulations. This analysis
is followed by three different panel data econometric models that included data from the
17 countries from 2008 to 2018. The first one is a logit binary model; the second one will
be a random effects model, and the third a dynamic panel data model using a two-step
dynamic generalized method of moments method.
3.3.1 Welch T-test for the Zscore
This study will use a Welch T-test to evaluate the mean difference level of financial
stability using the Zscore between banks in countries with and without sustainable policies
in the banking industry. Understanding the difference between the means of financial
stability in countries with and without sustainable finance regulations can explain the
effects these types of policies can project on the banks’ risk management and stability in
this region.
Usually, mean difference studies apply a simple T-test of two independent means. This
way, the means of each financial stability indicator (Zscore) during the period studied for
each country can be compared. However, the amount of countries and banks that rely on
sustainable finance regulations (7 countries and about 70 banks) is significantly lower than
those with conventional finance regulations (14 countries and 140 banks). Consequently,
a Welch T-test would be a more reliable method to estimate the means of each when the
observations and variances differ significantly.
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The Welch’s t-test defines the t-statistic by the following formula:
t =
Z
S
=
X1 −X2√
s21
n1
+
s21
n2
(3.2)
Where:
Xi: Sample mean for i = 1, 2
s2i : Sample variance for i = 1, 2
ni: Sample size for i = 1, 2
The first sample of the mean will include the sample countries that possess sustainable
financial regulations. Consequently, the second sample includes the rest of the countries
that remain with current banking regulations. Similarly, the variance and sample size
correspond to countries with sustainable finance regulations and current regulations.
3.3.2 Binary Logistic (Logit) Regression Model
This study will apply a logistic or logit regression model in order to explain the effects
of the existence of sustainable finance regulations on banks’ financial stability. A logit
panel regression provides an efficient evaluation of a categorical variable’s effects over a
nominal variable. This happens because this statistical analysis transforms the dependent
variable:
oddsi =
Pi
1 − Pi (3.3)
Where:
oddsi: ratio of probability of success
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Pi: Probability of i
Then, the logarithm of the odds is calculated as:
Li = ln
(
Pi
1 − Pi
)
(3.4)
Where,
Li: Logarithm of the ratio of probability of success.
Now, by using a linear regression, the previous equation can be expressed as:
Li = β1 + β2Xi,t + ui,t (3.5)
Finally, the model that will be used for this thesis will be:
SFRi,t = β1 + β2 ln zi,t + ui,t (3.6)
Where:
SFRi,t: dichotomic variable for banks located in countries with or without sustainable
finance regulation, tanking the values of 0 and 1, respectively,
βi: coefficient of the variables for i = 1, 2
ln(z)i,t: natural logarithm of the Zscore, and
ui,t: error component.
For this model, the dependent variable is the dummy variable SFRi,t and the indepen-
dent variable is ln(z)i,t.
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3.3.3 Random Effects
This study will apply a random effect analysis to study the effects of sustainable finance
regulations on Latin American countries’ financial stability. The random-effects model is
a panel data analysis method that handles the constant for each section as a random
parameter. The variability of the constants can be defined as:
ai = a+ vi (3.7)
where vi is a zero mean standard random variable. This quality can be defined as the
assumption that each cross section differs in its intercept term.
Thus, the random effects model takes the form:
Yit = (a+ vi) + β1X1it + β2X2it + ...+ βkXkit + uit (3.8)
or
Yit = α + β1X1it + β2X2it + ...+ βkXkit + (vi + uit) (3.9)
This study will use a random-effects model given that the sample is unbalanced, or
in other words, the number of time series (years) differs from the number of cross-section
data (banks).
Now, with equation 3.9, the model used in this thesis can be defined as:
lnZitj = α + β1Xjt + β2Bit + β3SFRjt + (vi + uit) (3.10)
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where:
i, t, andj: bank, time, and country, respectively.
ln(Z)i,t: natural logarithm of the bank’s financial stability measure,
αi,t: constant value,
Xj,t: macroeconomic control vector,
Bi,t: bank specific control variables vector, and
SFRi,t: dummy variable of the bank i that published sustainability reports in the year t.
The dependent variable of the regression is ln(Z)i,t, SFRi,t is the independent variable,
and Xj,t and Bi,t are the control variables. Additionally, several statistical tests will be
applied to the resulting model of the random effects panel, including the Joint test, the
Breusch-Pagan test, and the Hausman test and the Durbin-Watson test. This test will
support using random effects over a pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS) or a fixed-
effect model.
Joint Hypothesis test
The Joint Hypothesis test is a statistical test used in panel data models to understand
whether to use a pooled OLS or a fixed-effect model. The null hypothesis of the test states
that the pooled OLS model is adequate. The test’s output provides a F − statistic and
a corresponding p-value. The null hypothesis is rejected when the test provides a p-value
lower than 0.05.
Breusch-Pagan LM test
The Breusch-Pagan LM test (Greene and McKenzie, 2012) is a test used in panel
data models to decide whether to use a pooled OLS or a random-effects method. This
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test evaluates the pooled OLS residuals to understand which method is adequate for the
model. The null hypothesis of the test states that the pooled OLS method is adequate for
the model. The output of the test provides an LM statistic with its corresponding p-value.
If the p-value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, supporting the random effect
model.
Hausman test
TThe Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is a statistical test that is used to measure the
consistency of both the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the generalized least squares
(GLS). The test is used to assist in deciding between fixed effects and random effects. The
null hypothesis of the test states that the random effects are consistent and efficient for the
model. The test provides an H-statistic, which provides a p-value, the information needed
to decide on rejecting the null hypothesis (if lower than 0.05). In that case, the test implies
that the fixed effects model is more appropriate since it is consistent.
3.3.4 Dynamic Panel Data Analysis
This thesis uses a dynamic panel data analysis to study the influence of sustainable
banking regulations on the systemic financial stability of the countries in the region. The
main difference between a regular panel data analysis and a dynamic panel analysis is
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. One of the most
reliable methods to estimate parameters for a dynamic panel analysis is the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM). A GMM method consists of a parametric method for esti-
mating parameters in statistical panel data.
The model proposed to estimate this relationship will be the following:
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ln(Z)i,t = αi,t + β1ln(Z)i,t−1 + β2gi,t + β3Xi,t + β4Bi,t + β5SFRi,t + Ei,t (3.11)
where:
i, t, and j: bank, time and country, respectively,
ln(Z)i,t: natural logarithm of the bank’s financial stability measure,
αi,t: constant value,
ln(Z)i,t−1: natural logarithm of the bank’s financial stability measure,
Xi,t: macroeconomic control vector,
Bi,t stands for the vector of bank specific control variables,
SFRi,t: dummy variable for banks functioning in a country with or without sustainable
finance regulations.
A lagged dependent variable will also be included as an independent variable given the
possible persistence of a bank’s stability (Agoraki et al., 2011; Bermpei et al., 2018). Fur-
thermore, the control vectors will smooth the macroeconomic and financial components.
Therefore, the control variables will address the differences shown in different countries
regarding their economic development and stability that affect the performance, and con-
sequently, the ROA. This way, the influence and effects of regulations on financial stability
will be more precise and reliable. Lastly, to identify the validity of the model, several
tests will be applied including the Wald tests for the joint significance of the regressors,
the second-order autocorrelation (AR(2)) of the residuals test, and the Sargan test for
overidentification.
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Wald test
The Wald test is a statistical test used to determine the explanatory variables’ sig-
nificance or validity in a model. The Wald statistic evaluates the null hypothesis that
the parameters are not valuable for the model. To reject the null hypothesis implies that
removing or changing variables would affect the model significantly.
AR(2) test
The second-order autocorrelation of the error terms test, or AR(2), tests for the null
hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation. Failing to reject the null hy-
pothesis of this test would mean that the test model conditions are correctly specified, and
there is no serial autocorrelation.
Sargan test
Sargan test for overidentification evaluates the validity of the instruments of the model.
The test analyzes the null hypothesis that states that the instruments are valid. The
evaluation consists of an s statistics asymptotically distributed as chi-square with degrees
of freedom, which are equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions. If the value of
the p-value falls under 0.05, the test rejects the null hypothesis, which would mean that
the model’s instruments are not valid.
3.3.5 Limitations and Boundaries
The availability of some financial, macroeconomic, and sustainable data is limited,
given that individual banks in some countries in the Latin American region keep a low-level
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official accounting data available. Some banks keep some of their documents confidential,
or the ones provided have different formats, which means that analyzing each document to
create a database of the bank’s financial and sustainable indicators could take extra effort.
Additionally, to obtain the data, it was necessary to review some countries’ accounting
guidelines to understand financial statements. Formatting of the documents was not the
best quality, so most of the data had to be typed, opening space for errors in the data set.
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Chapter 4
Results
The following section presents and examines the experimental results of the statisti-
cal methods outlined in Chapter 3. The first subsection describes the main descriptive
statistics of the variables used in the study. Second, this chapter shows the result for the
different panel data models proposed: the logit binary model, the fixed effects model, and
the dynamic model using a GMM method. Thus, the effects of the green finance regula-
tions on the bank’s financial stability are explained, and various implications for design
are discussed.
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4.1 Data and descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for all the indicators used during this research can be found
in Table 4.1. The data analyzed consists of 1639 observations with one dependent variable,
two independent variables, and seven instrumental variables on a 11 years’ time period.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. dev
ln(z) 3.7342 3.7325 -1.1289 10.7520 1.1956
g 0.0156 0.0101 -0.4397 0.8264 0.0525
E/A 0.0918 0.0960 -8.9428 0.9993 0.3403
ROA 0.0151 0.0131 -0.0301 0.1224 0.0115
LLP/TL 0.0417 0.0275 -0.1199 1.5034 0.0905
dGDP 0.0593 0.0573 -0.3095 0.3195 0.0958
Inflation 6.6830 4.6760 -4.6206 41.119 7.4243
Table 4.2: Correlation Coefficients
ln(z) g E/A ROA LLP/TL dGDP Inflation
1.0000 −0.0786 0.1422 −0.0166 −0.0611 −0.0690 −0.1558 ln(z)
1.0000 0.0770 −0.0172 −0.0201 0.2446 −0.0505 g
1.0000 0.2653 −0.0528 −0.0107 0.0347 E/A
1.0000 0.0769 0.0335 0.3142 ROA
1.0000 −0.0139 0.0837 LLP/TL
1.0000 0.0295 dGDP
1.0000 Inflation
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First of all, the dependent variable ln(Z)i,t has a mean of 0.0156 and standard deviation
of 0.0525, reaching its lowest value was -0.4397 and its highest at 0.8264. However, the
natural logarithm of the Z-score has 399 missing values, the highest number of missing
values for any variable in the dataset.
Secondly, the independent dummy variable, SFR, has 1,639 observations. For this
sample, 1,291 are 0s or, in other words, come from countries that do not enforce sustainable
finance regulations (78.77% of the total sample). Regarding the 1s, or the data points from
countries that enforce these types of policies, there are 348 observations (21.77% of the total
sample). There are no missing values for this variable. Lastly, the independent variable
g(i, t) has a mean of 3.7342 and standard deviation of 1.1956, reaching its lowest value was
-1.1289 and its highest at 10.7520. However, the natural logarithm of the Z-score has 399
missing values, the highest number of missing values for any variable in the data set.
4.1.1 Sustainable Finance Regulation Categorical Variable
In the table below, the dichotomic variable that state the existence or lack of sustainable
finance regulations in the countries chosen for the study. This table follows the existent
regulations described in Chapter 1. Therefore, the countries that apply sustainable reg-
ulations in their financial sector will have a number ”1” and the rest will have a number
”0”.
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Table 4.3: Sustainable Finance Policies in Latin America
Country Key Policies Policy Aim Date Established
Brazil
Protocolo Verde
Sustainable Finance Prac-
tices
1995
Regulation N° 3,545
Protextion of the Amazon
Biome
2008
Regulation N° 3,813 Sugarcane investment 2009
Regulation N° 3,876 Slave labor 2010
Regulation N° 3,547
Good practices that miti-
gate environmental and so-
cial risks
2011
Regulation N° 4,327
Social and Environmental
Responsibility for financial
institutions
2014
Regulation N° 4,557
Social and Environmental
Responsibility for financial
institutions
2017
Colombia Protocolo Verde Green Finance 2012
Ecuador
Protocolo de Banca
Sustentable
Green Finance 2016
Mexico
Protocolo de Sus-
tentabilidad de la
Banca
Sustainable Banking Re-
quirements
2016
Green Bonds Princi-
ples
Green Finance 2018
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Table 4.3 Continued
Country Key Policies Policy Aim Date Established
Panama
Protocolo de Finan-
zas Sustentables de
Panama
Green Finance 2018
Peru
Resolution N° 1928-
2015
Regulation for Social and
Environmental Risk Man-
agement
2015
Document SBS N° 01-
2015
The role of enhanced due
diligence in the regulation
of socioenvironmental risk
management for financial
firms
2015
Gu´ıa de Bonos Verdes
para el Peru´
Green Bonds Guidelines 2018
Table 4.4: Sustainable Finance Regulations Dummy Variable
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 represent the existence of sustainable banking regulations.
0 represent the inexistence of sustainable banking regulations.
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Table 4.4 Continued
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dom. Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Paraguay 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Puerto Rico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 represent the existence of sustainable banking regulations.
0 represent the inexistence of sustainable banking regulations.
4.2 Welch t-test for the Z-score
The Welch t-test for two means difference compares the means of the values of the
natural logarithms of the Z-score of the countries with and without environmental finance
regulations. This test’s null hypothesis states that the true difference between the means
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of the two samples is 0. The first sample includes countries with sustainable finance
regulations, with 341 observations, a mean of 3.8563, and a standard deviation of 1.1178.
Furthermore, the second sample consists of data from countries without environmental
finance regulations, including 847 observations with a mean of 3.6419, and a standard
deviation of 1.0354.
The results of the statistical analysis (see table 4.6) display a t-statistic of 3.1548 and
a p-value of 0.0016 after using 1,188 data points. These values indicate that the t-statistic
is statistically significant. Thus, there is significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis
that states that the difference between the mean of the group of banks in countries with
sustainable regulations and the banks in countries without them is equal to 0.
Table 4.5: Two Sample t-test Mean Difference Results Comparing Banks in Countries with
and without Sustainable Banking Regulations
SFR Dummy n Mean SD t-cal df p-value decision
1 338 89.69 145.16 2.75 473 0.0061 Reject
0 847 65.94 101.27
4.3 Panel Data Analysis
The following section will include the results of a panel data analysis (additional to
the two sample means difference T-test) using the models described in Chapter 3. The
following subsections will elaborate on the model construction process, with a detailed
analysis of its findings. First, the process for model identification and construction is
explained. Then, the two-step generalized method of moments panel data analysis result
is presented.
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4.3.1 Model Identification and Construction
After the data gathering, calculating, and cleaning process, all the data points were im-
ported to the software Gretl. The identification and construction process consisted of using
several statistical tests between different statistical models to recognize the best fit. The
statistical panel data models tested were the binary logit regression, pooled OLS model,
random effects model, fixed-effects model, and two-step dynamic model. The statistical
tests include the White test, AR(2) Test, Hausman Test, and the Sargan over-identification
test.
Moreover, another technique applied consisted of changing the number of time periods
in the dataset. During this process, 8 different models were created for each of the statistical
models mentioned above. Finally, the models that best explained the effects of this study
were Random Effect and a Two-Step Dynamic Panel Data Analysis, as recommended in
the literature (Bermpei et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2019).
4.3.2 Logit Analysis
The results for the logit panel regression analysis can be found on Table 4. The depen-
dent variable for the model was the dichotomic variable SFR and the independent variable
lnZ. The value of the coefficient of the independent variable was 0.2076 and a standard
error of 0.0641. The p-value of the model for the independent variable is 0.0012, which is
statistically significant. Finally, the log-likelihood of the model is 11.3803 with a p-value of
0.0007. Therefore, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that states that the sustainable
finance regulations are not associated with the value of the Z-score.
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Table 4.6: Logit Regression
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Z p-value
const -1.6948 0.2536 -6.681 < 0.0001
lnZ 0.2076 0.0641 3.235 0.0012
Log-likelihood 11.3803 0.0007
4.3.3 Random Effects Panel Data Analysis
The results shown in Table 4.7 show the random effects panel data analysis that explains
the relationship between sustainable finance regulations and the logarithm of the Z-score.
The number of observations used in this analysis was 1,181 observations, within 143 cross
sectional units and 11 time series, from 2008 to 2018.
The dependent variable for this model was the logarithm of the Zscore independent
variable in this model is the dummy variable for Sustainable Finance Regulations. This
variable showed a positive relationship with the dependent variable from models 1 to 7
and showing the coefficients 0.3037, 0.2913, 0.2770, 0.2704, 0.2772, 0.2217, and 0.1786,
respectively. The p-values had a value under 0.05 of the coefficients presented statistical
significance, except for the model 8. The rest of the variables are used as control variables,
but the signs that are shown in table 4.7 are coherent.
Joint test
The p-values for the F -statistic were under 0.05 for all in all the models (see Table 4.7).
Therefore the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS model is adequate is rejected, meaning
that the fixed effects method is more adequate for the model.
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Breusch-Pagan test
The Breusch-Pagan test showed p-values under 0.05 for the LM statistic of all the
models tested (see Table 4.7). These values provide enough evidence to reject the null
hypothesis of the test. Therefore, the random effects method is more adequate than the
pooled OLS method.
Hausman Test
The Hausman test diagnostic was applied to all the random effect models (see Table 4.7)
to evaluate whether the methods applied were accurate to calculate the model’s estimators.
The values of the test were 0.2445, 0.4779, 0.6360, 0.2940, 0.1590, 0.1180, and 0.0819 for
models 1 to 7, respectively. All the values were higher than 0.05, implying that there is not
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, the random effects are consistent
within the models.
4.3.4 Dynamic Panel Data Analysis
The models shown in table 4.8 illustrate the results for the Two-Step GMM Dynamic
Panel Data Analysis that explains the influence of sustainable finance regulations on a
bank’s financial stability. This data analysis model will include a lagged dependent variable
as an independent variable to explain the financial stability continuity and gradual changes
in banks and financial institutions (Bermpei et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2019). The panel
regression consisted of 1031 observations within 143 cross sectional units and 11 time series.
The dependent variable used in the model is Zscorei,t, while the independent variables
were SFRi,t and gi,t. The rest of the variables, ROE, A/E, ROA, LLP/TL, and dGDP,
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are used as control variables to understand its effect on the independent variables. Finally,
the lagged value of the dependent variable was defined as Zscore(−1) and consists of
theZ − score delayed by one year for every bank.
The dichotomic independent variable SFRi,t showed a positive relationship with the
dependent variable from the models 8 to 15 with the coefficients 22.1588, 22.1253, 21.6187,
21.471, 21.0879, 20.5332, 16.7295, and 18.7669. All of the p-values of the coefficients are
lower than 0.1, demonstrating statistical significance in the model.
Moreover, the growth of the total assets of each bank showed a negative relationship
with the Z-score. The value of the parameters increased as more bank related instrumental
variables where added and the variable lost statistical significance when the country based
instrumental variables where included in the model. The values of the parameters for the
sustainable regulations dummy variable were, from the model 8 to 14, −66.8118, −10.7936,
−9.06660, −10.5172, −42.4789, −45.6591, and −52.0403, respectively.
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Wald (Joint) test
The diagnostic test of the Wald statistic had values of 24.7804, 32.0764, 43.5989, 44.001,
42.8395, 55.179, 72.1172, 73.569, for models 8 to 15, respectively. The values of the Wald
statistics generated p-values lower than 0.05, rejecting the null hypothesis in every case.
Consequently, the test implies that the explanatory variables used for these models are
valid.
AR(2) test
The the second-order autocorrelation of the error terms test provided as output the
p-values 0.7612, 0.7698, 0.5954, 0.5896, 0.6499, 0.4134, 0.4394, and 0.3820 for the models
7 to 15, respectively. None of the values has a value under 0.05. Therefore, the test fails to
reject the null hypothesis, so the moment conditions are correctly specified and the original
error is uncorrelated.
Sargan test
The Sargan test is used to search for overidentification from the model’s parameters.
the models 14 and 15’s outcome p-values are 0.0341 and 0.0493, respectively. These values
imply that the test rejects the null hypothesis for the last models, which affects the validity
of the instruments for those models. However, the value of most of the Sargan test p-values
in the rest of the models are greater than 0.05, failing to reject the null hypothesis of the
test and, therefore, proving the validity of the instruments used for those models.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
This research study aims to demonstrate a relationship between the existence of sus-
tainable finance regulations and financial stability for banks in Latin America. The results
also show that sustainable finance practices have a significant effect on banks’ financial
stability. This evidence is indisputable in the Welch T-test and the dynamic panel data
analysis using a 2-step GMM model.
First, the two-sample Welch t-test (Table 4.5) evidences a significant difference between
the mean of the zscore between banks that operate in countries with (M = 89.69, SD =
145.16) and without (M = 65.94, SD = 101.27) sustainable finance regulations, with
confidence level of 99% (t-cal = 2.75, p = .0061). Therefore, these results provide enough
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that states that the difference in the mean of the
zscore between banks in both groups is 0. This test implies that the levels of financial
stability between both groups of banks are significantly different, showing higher levels for
the banks operating under country-level sustainable regulations. However, this test does
not remove any bias that comes from indicators that may affect the Zscore.
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Furthermore, the binary logit analysis (Table 4.6) shows a positive relationship be-
tween the odds of a country implementing sustainable finance regulations and the financial
stability in the banks of those countries. The sign of the regression coefficient reflects a
positive relationship. Although the value of the coefficient is close to zero, implying a small
effect of the estimator. The null hypothesis of the model is that the Zscore coefficient is
equal to zero, indicating no association with the existence of sustainable finance regula-
tions. The p-value of the coefficient (p=.0012) is lower than the significance level of .001.
Consequently, the test exhibits a statistically significant association between the banks’
financial stability and the existence of sustainable regulations in the country in which they
operate. The results from these tests imply that banks with financial stability are essential
for policymakers to introduce sustainable finance regulations in the banking regulatory
framework, though it is not a necessary condition.
This relationship aligns with findings in the literature (Bermpei et al., 2018) that show
that it is more probable for a bank to have a higher Zscore in the existence of political and
institutional stability. The results suggest a bidirectional relationship between sustainable
finance regulations and financial stability. However, the low value of the coefficient could
imply that countries that lack financial stability avoid considering environmental policies
given the costs that the actions from these regulations bring (Orlitzky et al., 2011) in the
financial sector, particularly for projects that have high initial costs.
Next, the random effect models (table 4.7) show higher levels of financial stability for
banks in countries with sustainable banking regulations. Also, the Hausman test shows
that the random-effects model is the best fit for the analysis. The results were consistent
in Models 1 to 6, regardless of the inclusion of control variables representing banking
performance and macroeconomic performance. However, after including inflation to the
regression, the coefficient for Model 7 was not statistically significant. The value of the
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Durbin-Watson test for all models was under 1.5 for all the fixed-effect models. This
value indicates a positive serial correlation in the regressions. Also, previous periods of
financial stability or instability can affect financial stability significantly in the next year.
Hence, another factor that could be producing a bias in the model is the absence of a
lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. The positive autocorrelation and
the inexistence of a lagged Zscore create a bias that the dynamic panel model adjusts.
Lastly, the dynamic panel model (table 4.8) evidences a significant positive relationship
between a bank’s financial stability and environmental policies in the banking sector. The
model shows a positive relationship for all the coefficients of the lagged dependent vari-
able and the zscore while being statistically significant. This positive relationship implies
that banks have higher financial stability when they operate in countries with sustainable
finance regulations. Also, the results show that a precedent history of financial stabil-
ity can increase the chances of a bank maintaining its stability. Consequently, following
the hypothesis, financial stability between banks operating in countries with and without
sustainable finance regulations display a significant difference.
These findings contribute a clearer understanding of the implications of sustainable
legislation in the banking industries on financial institutions’ financial stability. The study
results build on existing research regarding the importance of climate mitigation policies in
the banking sector (Battiston et al., 2017). Similarly, this research relates to other studies
that found that sustainable finance regulations create a more stable financial sector (Zadek
and Robins, 2016; Weber, 2017). Furthermore, the results are consistent with research that
has found lower systemic risk and asset price volatility due to climate risk-related legislation
(Battiston et al., 2017). These results build on existing evidence of sustainability regulation
in the banking sector, creating stability in the Chinese financial sector (Cui et al., 2018),
and contribute by including results from the Latin American banking industry.
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Additionally, this research aligns with studies that found positive impacts of evaluating
sustainable policies in the financial sector. Some of these studies include the Green Credit
Policy in China and its relationship with positive financial performance (Weber, 2017;
Cui et al., 2018). Another example is the environmental risk management guidelines in
Bangladesh, which provide significant insight into banks’ negative performance (Weber
and Oni, 2015). Sustainable finance regulations have also shown a positive impact over the
carbon footprint of a bank’s portfolio (Zadek and Robins, 2016), as well as an increase of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, and self-regulation in the financial industry
(Chih et al., 2010).
Furthermore, previous research focused on the adverse effects of climate and social
risks on individual and systemic perspectives (Rozenberg et al., 2013; Campiglio et al.,
2018), credit risk (Bauer and Hann, 2012), and financial performance (Dam and Scholtens,
2015; Weber and Oni, 2015). In contrast, considering that sustainable regulations in the
banking sector increase the sustainable practices in banks (Weber, 2017), these results
demonstrate that sustainable practices by the banking sector promotes financial stability.
Consequently, this research addresses a gap in the academic literature between sustainable
finance, financial stability, and macroprudential regulations. Additionally, most previous
empirical research on sustainable finance aimed to study countries like China, Bangladesh,
and Nigeria (Weber, 2012; Weber and Oni, 2015; Jiang et al., 2019). In contrast, this
research mainly researched countries in Latin America, which addresses another gap in the
literature that links sustainability and financial studies.
Moreover, this study’s results represent an opportunity for scholars in the areas of eco-
nomics, financial stability, and sustainability management. These results should be consid-
ered when studying the connection between financial stability, systemic risk, and sustain-
able finance practices. In contrast with popular theories on financial stability that consider
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the correlation of financial institutions’ portfolios as a source systemic risk (Acharya, 2009),
these results show the implications that social and environmental risks have to control sys-
temic risk. Therefore, these results represent an empirical groundwork for developing a
theoretical framework that includes the existence of sustainable practices and regulations
in the financial sector on systemic risk and financial stability, following literature on climate
risk and economic stability (Skidmore, 2001).
Regarding the limitations of the study, the lack of availability in the Latin American
region may challenge the reliability of the results. Accounting and financial information
from banks in Latin America are limited to online databases. Therefore, the data collected
was obtained manually on the banks’ websites. This data collection methodology increases
the chances of typing errors and attrition bias for large data sets. Additionally, each country
has different regulations regarding the finance and accounting information that must stay
public. Further research involving optimized data collection methods is required.
This study analyzed the biggest banks in each country according to their assets. The
banks used in the data sample are either international banks or local financial institutions
of significant size regarding their assets. Therefore the results of this study may apply for
big banks, although the reliability of the implications in this study may be different for
small and medium-sized banks.
The methodology applied consists of measuring financial exposure by comparing the
bank’s solvency risk using the banks’ scores in Latin America. Therefore, these results
should be analyzed as a marginal contribution to the financial sector’s systemic risk in the
region. Other systemic risk and financial soundness indicators should be used in further
research to understand better the implications of macroprudential environmental legislation
in the financial sector. Some indicators that could be used include CoVar, the First-to-
Default probability, Systemic Expected Shortfall, and distribution of systemic loss.
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Regarding sustainability management, the analysis exclusively evaluated the existence
of a sustainable regulatory framework in the banks where the banks analyzed to operate.
These regulations were imposed by governments, central banks, or a group of banks that
had a sustainable initiative. However, the multinational nature of most of the banks studied
implies that the internal policies of these corporations may be followed across borders.
Therefore, banks operating in countries without legislation that enforces sustainability in
the banking sector might be using sustainable finance practices. As the analysis ignores
individual indicators of sustainability, the conclusions exclude the impact of individual
banks. Future research should evaluate individual actions and sustainable disclosures from
specific financial entities.
Finally, the results provide empirical evidence to reject the null hypothesis stated previ-
ously in the second chapter. Consequently, the evidence accepts the alternative hypothesis
stating that the existence of sustainable finance regulations has a significant effect on the
financial stability of banks in Latin America.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The following section will provide the concluding remarks of this master’s thesis, cov-
ering the author’s perspective on the main implications, both practical and academic, as
well as the main limitations and research opportunities that arise.
This thesis analyzed the impact of sustainable finance regulations on the financial sta-
bility of banks in Latin America. The financial stability of 149 banks in 17 countries from
2008 to 2018 was quantified and tested with several quantitative analysis methods. These
included a two mean difference Welch t-test, a binary logit panel analysis, a random-effects
panel data analysis, and a dynamic panel regression using a two-step GMM model. Based
on the quantitative analysis of the leading banks of the countries studied, the main con-
clusion of this thesis is that sustainable finance regulations show a positive impact on the
financial stability of the banks in the financial sector.
This research studied the connection between sustainable finance practices and financial
stability. A sustainable finance practice consists of a bank’s strategy to reach sustainable
development. A sustainable finance strategy includes both organizational behaviour and
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business decision-making strategies. The investigation concentrates on countries in Latin
America, highlighting the inclusion of sustainability practices in the legal framework of the
financial sector of Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Paraguay. The literature
suggests that strategies that aim to develop the economy, society, and environment can
strengthen financial stability.
Furthermore, the literature review presents a case to demonstrate the positive and
significant influence of sustainable finance regulations on a bank’s financial stability. The
literature review shows that policymakers continuously consider using regulations to control
financial stability and systemic risk. Additionally, the literature shows that sustainable
practices in the financial sector promote economic development and financial stability.
The connection between financial stability and sustainable finance seems logical, though
research regarding this connection is scarce, evidencing a gap in the literature.
Therefore, the methodology for this study compares banks operating in countries with
and without sustainable finance regulations. This analysis consists of: a two-mean differ-
ence between both groups using a Welch t-test, a binary logit panel regression, a random-
effects panel regression, and a dynamic panel regression using a 2-step GMM model. The
results show a significant relationship between sustainable finance regulations and financial
stability.
Based on these conclusions, future research should consider some factors. By only
analyzing accounting figures, a layer of risk was assessed and evaluated. Hence, the quality
of the analysis is relevant for institutional risk. However, financial stability analysis still
needs to be developed within sustainability management, especially towards the implication
of sustainable policies over systemic risk. More research is needed to evaluate the impact of
sustainable measures and its effect on systemic risk, evaluating several systemic risk related
indicators such as the CoVar indicator, the First-to-Default probability, Systemic Expected
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Shortfall (SES), distribution of systemic loss, and other financial soundness indicators
endorsed by the FMI.
Additionally, the implications of introducing this kind of policy should also be analyzed.
The time of application and characteristics of the policies is imperative for the entire econ-
omy, as shocks coming from climate change could be early forecasted and, consequently,
mitigated to reduce the implications over households and financial firms (Skidmore, 2001).
The cost of adaptation and transition of new regulations needs to be studied to understand
the short, medium, and long term implications of said policies and critical aspects to ensure
a successful adaptation of firms and households.
This study also consists of data from an entire continent where the most prominent
banks from selected countries were analyzed. This type of quantitative analysis could bring
some bias given economic, social, political, and other factors over the accounting data used
to estimate each bank’s financial stability. Country specific mixed methodologies and case
studies could be applied within the Latin American region to evaluate the macroprudential
implications of sustainable regulations in the financial sector. This way, any international
bias that could disturb the analysis can be minimized as much as possible.
Finally, this thesis evidences a link between financial stability and sustainable finance
regulations. Therefore, Central Banks and governments should consider, such when evalu-
ating the potential risks of environmental externalities on the financial system. Also, firms
that have not yet adopted sustainable policies should consider the results of this thesis,
given the resilience aspects that environmental institutions provide to firms that prevail in
the results.
This thesis also contributes to the academy by filling a research gap regarding Latin
American financial sustainability and the relationship between financial stability and sus-
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tainable finance regulations. Additionally, this study evidences the effect of sustainable
finance practices on financial stability. Finally, this masters’ thesis provides an empirical
framework to develop a theory on financial stability and sustainability.
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Appendix A
Country and Bank Specific
descriptive Statistics
A.1 List of Banks in the Study by Country
The following table (Table A.1) provides a list of the 149 banks included in the analysis.
The descriptive statistics for the banks are included in the Appendix A. The descriptive
statistics include the main variables used in the study for every bank.
Table A.1: List of Banks in the study by Country
Argentina
Banco Credicoop Coop. Ltdo. Banco Macro S.A.
Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires Banco Patagonia S.A.
Banco de la Nacion Argentina Banco Santander Rio S.A.
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires Bbva Banco Frances S.A.
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Table A.1 Continued
Banco Galicia Buenos Aires Hsbc Bank Argentina S.A.
Banco Hipotecario S.A.
Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China S.A.
Bolivia
Banco Bisa S.A. Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A.
Banco de Credito de Bolivia S.A. Banco Nacional de Bolivia
Banco Economico S.A.
Banco para el Fomento de Iniciativas
Economicas S.A.
Banco Fissa Banco Solidario S.A.
Banco Ganadero S.A. Banco Union S.A.
Brazil
Banco do Brasil Bradesco Banco
Banco Safra S.A Btg Pactual
Banco Santander Brasil -Adr Caixa Economica Federal
Banco Votorantim S.A. Citibank N.A.
Bndes Itau Unibanco Hldg S.A.
Chile
Banco Consoricio Santiago Banco Security
Banco Credito e Inversiones Bbva Chile
Banco de Chile Bicecorp
Banco del Estado de Chile Bic Itau Corpbanca Chile
Banco Santander-Chile Scotiabank Chile
Colombia
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Table A.1 Continued
Banco Agrario de Colombia S.A. Bancolombia
Banco de Bogota Bbva Colombia
Banco GNB Sudameris Colpatria
Banco Occidente Banco Davivienda
Banco Popular-Colombia Itau Corpbanca Colombia
Costa Rica
Banco BAC San Jose Banco Improsa
Banco BCT Banco Nacional de Costa Rica
Banco Davivienda, S.A. Banco Promerica
Banco de Costa Rica Citibank Costa Rica
Banco General Scotiabank de Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Banco BDI, S.A. Banco Multiple BHD Leon
Banco de Ahorro y Credito Union S.A. Banco Multiple Santa Cruz
Banco de Nueva Escocia Banco Popular Dominicano, S.A.
Banco de Reservas de la Repubica Do-
minicana
Banco Vimenca
Banco Dominicano del Progreso Citibank, N.A.
Ecuador
Banco Bolivariano Banco de la Produccion Produbanco
Banco de Guayaquil Mutualista Pichincha
Guatemala
Banco Promerica de Guatemala, S.A. Banco G & T Continental, S.A.
BAC Reformador Banco Internacional, S.A.
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Table A.1 Continued
Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala Banrural S.A.
Banco de Guatemala
Credito Hipotecario Nacional de
Guatemala
Banco de los Trabajadores
Honduras
Banco del Pais, S.A. Banco de Occidente S.A.
Banco Atlantida
Banco Financiera Centroamericana
S.A. Ficensa
Banco Davivienda Honduras, S.A.
Banco Financiera Comercial Hon-
durena S.A. (Banco Ficohsa)
Banco de America Central Honduras,
S.A.(Bac Bamer)
Banco Lafise (Honduras), S.A.
Banco de Desarrollo Rural Honduras,
S.A.
Banco Promerica, S.A.
Mexico
Banco Inbursa Bancomext
Banco Interacciones Deustche Bank Mexico, S.A.
Banco Mercantil del Norte Hsbc Mexico
Banco Nacional de Mexico Scotiabank Inverlat, S.A.
Banco Santander Mexico
Panama
Bac International Bank Banesco
Banco General S A Banistmo
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Table A.1 Continued
Banco Latinoamericano de Comercio
Exterior
Caja de Ahorros
Banco Nacional de Panama Global Bank Corporation
Bancolombia (Panama) Multibank
Paraguay
Banco Atlas Banco Regional S.A.E.C.A.
Banco Continental Bbva Paraguay
Banco Gnb Paraguay Citibank Paraguay
Banco Itau Paraguay Sudameris Bank S.A.E.C.A.
Banco Nacional de Fomento Vision Banco S.A.E.C.A.
Peru
Banco Continental Banco Santander Peru S.A.
Banco de Credito del Peru Citibank del Peru S.A.
Banco Financiero Hsbc Bank Peru S.A. (Gnb)
Banco Interamericano de Finanzas Mi Banco
Banco Internacional del Peru Scotiabank Peru
Puerto Rico
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico Oriental Bank
Uruguay
Banco de La Republica Oriental del
Uruguay
Citibank N.A. Uruguay
Banco Hipotecario de Uruguay Hsbc Bank (Uruguay) S.A.
Banco Itau Uruguay Scotiabank Uruguay S.A.
Banco Santander Uruguay
80
Table A.1 Continued
Venezuela
Banco del Caribe Banco Venezolano de Credito
Banco Mercantil S.A. Banesco S.A.
Banco Nacional de Credito Bbva Banco Provincial
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A.2 Descriptive Statistics
The following subsections provide the descriptive statistics for every bank included in
the study for data collected from 2008 to 2018. All the banks are listed by country. The
table includes the variables of Total Asset to Capital ratio (TA/C), growth of the gross
domestic product (GDP Growth), Inflation, the logarithm of the z-Score (Ln(z)), loan loss
provision to total loans ratio (LLP/TL), ROA, and Total Asset growth.
A.2.1 Argentina
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Argentina
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco Credicoop Coop. Ltdo.
TA/C 0.0735 0.0145 0.0428 0.0942
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 31.1018 29.6540 95.7667 13.2108
LLP/TL 0.0175 0.0056 0.0281 0.0099
ROA 0.0175 0.0056 0.0281 0.0099
Total Asset Growth 0.0033 0.0131 0.0230 −0.0185
Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
TA/C 0.1167 0.0187 0.0864 0.1401
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 51.2043 67.4316 223.0971 12.5498
LLP/TL 0.0264 0.0081 0.0380 0.0179
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Table A.2 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0264 0.0081 0.0380 0.0179
Total Asset Growth 0.0077 0.0173 0.0298 −0.0183
Banco de la Nacion Argentina
TA/C 0.1167 0.0187 0.0864 0.1401
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 51.2043 67.4316 223.0971 12.5498
LLP/TL 0.0264 0.0081 0.0380 0.0179
ROA 0.0264 0.0081 0.0380 0.0179
Total Asset Growth 0.0077 0.0173 0.0298 −0.0183
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires
TA/C 0.1889 0.1920 0 0.4349
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 25.7219 27.9405 66.9144 1.5277
LLP/TL 0.0173 0.0074 0.0283 0.0089
ROA 0.0173 0.0074 0.0283 0.0089
Total Asset Growth 0.0062 0.0147 0.0283 −0.0072
Banco Galicia Buenos Aires
TA/C 0.0887 0.0098 0.0779 0.1120
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 45.5943 40.7345 134.1098 12.8073
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Table A.2 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0192 0.0071 0.0298 0.0063
ROA 0.0192 0.0071 0.0298 0.0063
Total Asset Growth 0.0091 0.0170 0.0338 −0.0143
Banco Hipotecario S.A.
TA/C 0.1906 0.0601 0.1193 0.2734
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 60.6859 63.8423 203.3739 11.0905
LLP/TL 0.0181 0.0080 0.0296 −0.0020
ROA 0.0181 0.0080 0.0296 −0.0020
Total Asset Growth −0.0014 0.0198 0.0285 −0.0348
Banco Macro S.A.
TA/C 0.1428 0.0222 0.1148 0.1931
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 78.3966 38.6340 141.6507 25.4178
LLP/TL 0.0375 0.0080 0.0477 0.0280
ROA 0.0375 0.0080 0.0477 0.0280
Total Asset Growth 0.0066 0.0146 0.0274 −0.0168
Banco Patagonia S.A.
TA/C 0.1410 0.0234 0.1143 0.1844
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
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Table A.2 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 25.6841 10.3245 51.2145 11.9858
LLP/TL 0.0386 0.0071 0.0531 0.0288
ROA 0.0386 0.0071 0.0531 0.0288
Total Asset Growth 0.0100 0.0252 0.0347 −0.0353
Banco Santander Rio S.A.
TA/C 0.1039 0.0178 0.0762 0.1269
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 40.0217 29.6671 105.6693 9.6572
LLP/TL 0.0298 0.0098 0.0448 0.0154
ROA 0.0298 0.0098 0.0448 0.0154
Total Asset Growth 0.0105 0.0181 0.0362 −0.0152
BBVA Banco Frances S.A.
TA/C 0.1166 0.0138 0.0900 0.1428
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 21.7535 7.5708 35.1372 12.8326
LLP/TL 0.0282 0.0088 0.0431 0.0124
ROA 0.0282 0.0088 0.0431 0.0124
Total Asset Growth 0.0059 0.0177 0.0305 −0.0165
HSBC Bank Argentina S.A.
TA/C 0.1128 0.0091 0.1029 0.1288
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
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Table A.2 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 22.7655 22.3299 66.8440 8.9576
LLP/TL 0.0171 0.0137 0.0369 0
ROA 0.0171 0.0137 0.0369 0
Total Asset Growth 0.0039 0.0229 0.0318 −0.0340
Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China S.A.
TA/C 0.1069 0.0105 0.0910 0.1184
GDP Growth 0.0658 0.1572 0.2722 −0.1933
Inflation 27.6175 8.8344 41.1194 15.3776
Ln(Z) 24.8232 17.0540 55.4840 12.5446
LLP/TL 0.0256 0.0067 0.0339 0.0141
ROA 0.0256 0.0067 0.0339 0.0141
Total Asset Growth 0.0070 0.0115 0.0288 −0.0038
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A.2.2 Bolivia
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Bolivia
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco BISA S.A.
TA/C 0.0930 0.0141 0.0721 0.1073
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 173.7534 284.8528 751.2652 26.7565
LLP/TL 0.0161 0.0029 0.0199 0.0123
ROA 0.0161 0.0029 0.0199 0.0123
Total Asset Growth 0.0115 0.0087 0.0265 0.0028
Banco de Credito de Bolivia S.A.
TA/C 0.0854 0.0135 0.0679 0.1149
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 36.7324 22.9722 73.9558 8.0146
LLP/TL 0.0152 0.0091 0.0378 0.0075
ROA 0.0152 0.0091 0.0378 0.0075
Total Asset Growth 0.0166 0.0091 0.0275 0.0031
Banco Economico S.A.
TA/C 0.0680 0.0072 0.0600 0.0795
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 64.7767 36.0237 107.3759 17.7031
LLP/TL 0.0105 0.0023 0.0140 0.0061
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Table A.3 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0105 0.0023 0.0140 0.0061
Total Asset Growth 0.0190 0.0093 0.0349 0.0038
Banco Fisa S.A.
TA/C 0.0755 0.0111 0.0671 0.1022
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 33.8846 28.8142 87.3663 3.2230
LLP/TL 0.0066 0.0058 0.0124 −0.0060
ROA 0.0066 0.0058 0.0124 −0.0060
Total Asset Growth 0.0801 0.0562 0.1871 0.0032
Banco Ganadero S.A.
TA/C 0.0613 0.0011 0.0596 0.0626
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 86.6559 28.0535 125.4032 58.3082
LLP/TL 0.0088 0.0009 0.0100 0.0077
ROA 0.0088 0.0009 0.0100 0.0077
Total Asset Growth 0.0171 0.0053 0.0243 0.0116
Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A.
TA/C 0.0690 0.0086 0.0553 0.0809
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 38.7843 29.6034 121.9892 14.6113
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Table A.3 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0123 0.0058 0.0247 0.0040
ROA 0.0123 0.0058 0.0247 0.0040
Total Asset Growth 0.0174 0.0100 0.0359 −0.0015
Banco Nacional de Bolivia
TA/C 0.0718 0.0041 0.0663 0.0793
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 60.3934 41.7017 150.3800 22.5638
LLP/TL 0.0113 0.0033 0.0169 0.0049
ROA 0.0113 0.0033 0.0169 0.0049
Total Asset Growth 0.0149 0.0073 0.0234 0.0032
Banco para el Fomento de Iniciativas Economicas S.A.
TA/C 0.0774 0.0026 0.0743 0.0814
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 40.0452 20.9322 60.6968 15.9254
LLP/TL 0.0090 0.0044 0.0133 0.0031
ROA 0.0090 0.0044 0.0133 0.0031
Total Asset Growth 0.0138 0.0067 0.0244 0.0072
Banco Solidario S.A.
TA/C 0.1138 0.0213 0.0839 0.1457
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
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Table A.3 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 63.8115 40.0503 113.1312 16.7557
LLP/TL 0.0184 0.0073 0.0250 0.0015
ROA 0.0184 0.0073 0.0250 0.0015
Total Asset Growth 0.0988 0.2379 0.7325 0.0060
Banco Union S.A.
TA/C 0.0684 0.0118 0.0470 0.0856
GDP Growth 0.1100 0.0809 0.2709 0.0001
Inflation 4.5117 5.8294 14.6024 −4.6206
Ln(Z) 31.6286 17.8541 70.5263 11.0046
LLP/TL 0.0093 0.0040 0.0180 0.0050
ROA 0.0093 0.0040 0.0180 0.0050
Total Asset Growth 0.0340 0.0317 0.0963 −0.0313
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A.2.3 Brazil
Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Brazil
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco do Brasil
TA/C 0.0538 0.0186 0 0.0721
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) 38.7790 18.9661 75.2022 5.5695
LLP/TL 0.0110 0.0034 0.0169 0.0057
ROA 0.0110 0.0034 0.0169 0.0057
Total Asset Growth 0.0058 0.0169 0.0360 −0.0279
Banco Safra
TA/C 0.0652 0.0065 0.0574 0.0766
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) 292.8466 309.3707 1000.7532 31.9122
LLP/TL 0.0123 0.0016 0.0144 0.0103
ROA 0.0123 0.0016 0.0144 0.0103
Total Asset Growth 0.0043 0.0146 0.0226 −0.0260
Banco Santander Brasil ADR
TA/C 0.1474 0.0276 0.0898 0.1897
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) 72.3335 43.8563 148.9110 27.3342
LLP/TL 0.0099 0.0043 0.0177 0.0046
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Table A.4 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0099 0.0043 0.0177 0.0046
Total Asset Growth 0.0095 0.0314 0.0981 −0.0158
Banco Vototarim S.A.
TA/C −0.8069 2.7005 −8.9428 0.0820
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) −18.9560 55.9865 16.8119 −158.5264
LLP/TL 0.0119 0.0310 0.1031 −0.0125
ROA 0.0119 0.0310 0.1031 −0.0125
Total Asset Growth −0.0254 0.0816 0.0688 −0.2278
BNDES
TA/C 0.0795 0.0225 0.0333 0.1200
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) 79.1990 76.6933 242.0366 8.6175
LLP/TL 0.0118 0.0047 0.0192 0.0067
ROA 0.0118 0.0047 0.0192 0.0067
Total Asset Growth 0.0059 0.0194 0.0393 −0.0224
BRADESCO BANCO
TA/C 0.0841 0.0062 0.0761 0.0941
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) 90.8444 79.2948 278.5607 19.9355
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Table A.4 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0137 0.0036 0.0169 0.0039
ROA 0.0137 0.0036 0.0169 0.0039
Total Asset Growth 0.0052 0.0159 0.0288 −0.0276
BTG Pactual
TA/C 0.1177 0.0423 0.0760 0.2006
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) 30.1864 31.8057 116.1364 3.1731
LLP/TL 0.0227 0.0088 0.0435 0.0110
ROA 0.0227 0.0088 0.0435 0.0110
Total Asset Growth 0.0131 0.0517 0.1441 −0.0775
Caixa Economica Federal
TA/C 0.0441 0.0088 0.0324 0.0583
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) 38.4517 21.9534 71.5639 11.8470
LLP/TL 0.0082 0.0026 0.0131 0.0033
ROA 0.0082 0.0026 0.0131 0.0033
Total Asset Growth 0.0074 0.0130 0.0239 −0.0172
Citibank N.A.
TA/C 0.0806 0.0095 0.0667 0.0952
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
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Table A.4 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 78.1899 227.5686 764.1176 3.4219
LLP/TL 0.0142 0.0147 0.0473 −0.0045
ROA 0.0142 0.0147 0.0473 −0.0045
Total Asset Growth 0.0019 0.0163 0.0433 −0.0113
Itau Unibanco HLDG S.A.
TA/C 0.0889 0.0096 0.0741 0.1031
GDP Growth 0.0390 0.1649 0.3250 −0.2662
Inflation 7.1175 1.9622 8.7786 3.0254
Ln(Z) 70.0907 64.3965 188.5412 15.2524
LLP/TL 0.0169 0.0020 0.0202 0.0134
ROA 0.0169 0.0020 0.0202 0.0134
Total Asset Growth 0.0089 0.0171 0.0425 −0.0170
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A.2.4 Chile
Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Chile
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco Consoricio Santiago
TA/C 0.1181 0.0260 0.0911 0.1720
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 28.1412 36.5971 110.4647 5.6516
LLP/TL 0.0156 0.0159 0.0545 −0.0102
ROA 0.0156 0.0159 0.0545 −0.0102
Total Asset Growth 0.0671 0.1116 0.3593 −0.0037
Banco Credito e Inversiones
TA/C 0.0761 0.0068 0.0618 0.0836
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 125.7032 87.9416 291.9302 34.7446
LLP/TL 0.0131 0.0024 0.0168 0.0096
ROA 0.0131 0.0024 0.0168 0.0096
Total Asset Growth 0.0100 0.0085 0.0248 −0.0045
Banco de Chile
TA/C 0.0928 0.0274 0.0716 0.1728
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 71.3115 34.1290 129.8472 28.9453
LLP/TL 0.0182 0.0026 0.0224 0.0145
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Table A.5 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0182 0.0026 0.0224 0.0145
Total Asset Growth 0.0048 0.0094 0.0218 −0.0104
Banco del Estado de Chile
TA/C 0.0466 0.0040 0.0423 0.0553
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 139.5720 146.6625 485.0984 34.6214
LLP/TL 0.0044 0.0009 0.0064 0.0035
ROA 0.0044 0.0009 0.0064 0.0035
Total Asset Growth 0.0070 0.0067 0.0195 −0.0042
Banco Santander Chile
TA/C 0.0831 0.0039 0.0758 0.0876
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 52.7153 23.7121 102.9155 30.5267
LLP/TL 0.0166 0.0028 0.0216 0.0128
ROA 0.0166 0.0028 0.0216 0.0128
Total Asset Growth 0.0048 0.0078 0.0153 −0.0083
Banco Security
TA/C 0.0710 0.0092 0.0571 0.0859
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 49.5922 33.9511 118.9096 10.7758
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Table A.5 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0086 0.0030 0.0115 0.0005
ROA 0.0086 0.0030 0.0115 0.0005
Total Asset Growth 0.0070 0.0098 0.0311 −0.0031
BBVA Chile
TA/C 0.0635 0.0045 0.0579 0.0705
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 84.9806 45.6054 177.5365 31.2760
LLP/TL 0.0063 0.0013 0.0087 0.0041
ROA 0.0063 0.0013 0.0087 0.0041
Total Asset Growth 0.0058 0.0125 0.0208 −0.0209
Bicecorp
TA/C 0.0894 0.0077 0.0747 0.1033
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 73.8857 71.7100 188.6576 0.9566
LLP/TL 0.0105 0.0057 0.0188 −0.0039
ROA 0.0105 0.0057 0.0188 −0.0039
Total Asset Growth 0.0377 0.1033 0.3403 −0.0410
Itau Corpbanca Chile
TA/C 0.1024 0.0120 0.0877 0.1212
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
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Table A.5 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 55.5288 45.0437 140.6288 5.9559
LLP/TL 0.0075 0.0082 0.0141 −0.0123
ROA 0.0075 0.0082 0.0141 −0.0123
Total Asset Growth 0.0228 0.0378 0.1268 −0.0103
Scotiabank Chile
TA/C 0.0603 0.0854 −0.1812 0.1015
GDP Growth 0.0545 0.0986 0.2677 −0.0641
Inflation 3.8297 2.5291 8.9623 −0.0534
Ln(Z) 38.4963 84.5927 222.9219 −109.1436
LLP/TL 0.0092 0.0033 0.0141 0.0039
ROA 0.0092 0.0033 0.0141 0.0039
Total Asset Growth 0.0187 0.0267 0.0819 −0.0143
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A.2.5 Colombia
Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Chile
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco Agrario de Colombia S.A.
TA/C 0.0942 0.0122 0.0777 0.1147
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 34.7777 30.0067 113.4507 12.1560
LLP/TL 0.0210 0.0074 0.0335 0.0106
ROA 0.0210 0.0074 0.0335 0.0106
Total Asset Growth 0.0058 0.0144 0.0321 −0.0240
Banco de Bogota
TA/C 0.1049 0.0180 0.0660 0.1223
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 157.1970 116.5138 354.3318 48.9743
LLP/TL 0.0098 0.0040 0.0187 0.0059
ROA 0.0098 0.0040 0.0187 0.0059
Total Asset Growth 0.0068 0.0123 0.0176 −0.0172
Banco GNB Sudameris
TA/C 0.0705 0.0060 0.0640 0.0848
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 78.8437 51.2167 162.2300 19.4055
LLP/TL 0.0093 0.0019 0.0131 0.0068
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Table A.6 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0093 0.0019 0.0131 0.0068
Total Asset Growth 0.0149 0.0199 0.0388 −0.0225
Banco Occidente
TA/C 0.1311 0.0165 0.1093 0.1657
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 78.9432 56.5405 162.0688 9.4831
LLP/TL 0.0120 0.0060 0.0289 0.0062
ROA 0.0120 0.0060 0.0289 0.0062
Total Asset Growth 0.0079 0.0179 0.0393 −0.0226
Banco Popular Colombia
TA/C 0.1279 0.0182 0.1071 0.1539
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 353.7244 625.9137 1292.4816 28.2033
LLP/TL 0.0083 0.0030 0.0118 0.0047
ROA 0.0083 0.0030 0.0118 0.0047
Total Asset Growth −0.0017 0.0140 0.0121 −0.0224
Bancolombia
TA/C 0.1531 0.0103 0.1381 0.1703
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 57.3673 36.2239 125.1399 16.3860
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Table A.6 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0215 0.0080 0.0371 0.0133
ROA 0.0215 0.0080 0.0371 0.0133
Total Asset Growth 0.0107 0.0141 0.0307 −0.0158
BBVA Colombia
TA/C 0.0793 0.0277 0 0.1020
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 94.0716 77.8624 265.5295 20.0280
LLP/TL 0.0144 0.0041 0.0198 0.0085
ROA 0.0144 0.0041 0.0198 0.0085
Total Asset Growth 0.0091 0.0153 0.0306 −0.0170
Colpatria
TA/C 0.0917 0.0094 0.0800 0.1113
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 133.2116 240.4804 643.8331 14.7902
LLP/TL 0.0160 0.0077 0.0320 0.0047
ROA 0.0160 0.0077 0.0320 0.0047
Total Asset Growth 0.0147 0.0186 0.0365 −0.0296
Banco Davivienda
TA/C −0.6974 2.5568 −7.9740 0.1308
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
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Table A.6 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) −404.2063 1418.5508 247.6691 −4181.5907
LLP/TL 0.0157 0.0098 0.0417 0.0068
ROA 0.0157 0.0098 0.0417 0.0068
Total Asset Growth 0.0134 0.0135 0.0328 −0.0095
Itau Corpbanca Colombia
TA/C 0.1248 0.0447 0.1011 0.2350
GDP Growth 0.0517 0.1285 0.2306 −0.2299
Inflation 4.1818 1.7092 7.7414 2.0785
Ln(Z) 57.3050 42.9279 137.8900 25.7724
LLP/TL 0.0068 0.0073 0.0190 −0.0011
ROA 0.0068 0.0073 0.0190 −0.0011
Total Asset Growth 0.0161 0.0390 0.0933 −0.0215
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A.2.6 Costa Rica
Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Costa Rica
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco BAC San Jose
TA/C 0.1126 0.0097 0.0898 0.1232
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 46.6162 44.9109 170.6223 13.1230
LLP/TL 0.0164 0.0057 0.0229 0.0022
ROA 0.0164 0.0057 0.0229 0.0022
Total Asset Growth 0.0186 0.0145 0.0539 −0.0021
Banco BCT
TA/C 0.1265 0.0115 0.1064 0.1442
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 44.1106 14.2341 69.4557 15.3275
LLP/TL 0.0129 0.0039 0.0209 0.0072
ROA 0.0129 0.0039 0.0209 0.0072
Total Asset Growth 0.0246 0.0269 0.0745 −0.0052
Banco Davivienda Costa Rica
TA/C 0.1007 0.0138 0.0872 0.1252
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 67.3928 69.7258 181.5001 4.6574
LLP/TL 0.0142 0.0152 0.0485 0.0036
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Table A.7 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0142 0.0152 0.0485 0.0036
Total Asset Growth 0.0156 0.0255 0.0776 −0.0199
Banco de Costa Rica
TA/C 0.0412 0.2019 −0.5672 0.1151
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 34.8871 48.1168 89.0243 −91.1792
LLP/TL 0.0089 0.0057 0.0248 0.0034
ROA 0.0089 0.0057 0.0248 0.0034
Total Asset Growth 0.0110 0.0305 0.0743 −0.0496
Banco General
TA/C 0.2456 0.2727 0.0851 0.9756
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 57.8509 34.9410 124.6112 6.6008
LLP/TL 0.0087 0.0193 0.0665 0.0003
ROA 0.0087 0.0193 0.0665 0.0003
Total Asset Growth 0.0967 0.1280 0.4188 6.4177 × 10−5
Banco Improsa
TA/C 0.0995 0.0165 0.0765 0.1196
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 81.9128 56.9970 227.7848 36.1890
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Table A.7 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0081 0.0021 0.0119 0.0050
ROA 0.0081 0.0021 0.0119 0.0050
Total Asset Growth 0.0099 0.0161 0.0380 −0.0175
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica
TA/C 0.0960 0.0293 0.0249 0.1525
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 74.5888 63.2115 222.2504 27.3244
LLP/TL 0.0079 0.0029 0.0141 0.0033
ROA 0.0079 0.0029 0.0141 0.0033
Total Asset Growth 0.0085 0.0095 0.0265 −0.0068
Banco Promerica
TA/C 0.0859 0.0090 0.0686 0.0960
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 49.2911 46.2679 138.7317 12.8950
LLP/TL 0.0113 0.0046 0.0228 0.0062
ROA 0.0113 0.0046 0.0228 0.0062
Total Asset Growth 0.0250 0.0095 0.0467 0.0086
Citibank Costa Rica
TA/C 0.1620 0.0394 0.0979 0.2223
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
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Table A.7 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 45.6419 21.1510 100.7535 26.2309
LLP/TL 0.0088 0.0066 0.0242 −0.0009
ROA 0.0088 0.0066 0.0242 −0.0009
Total Asset Growth −0.0066 0.0481 0.0966 −0.0769
Scotiabank de Costa Rica
TA/C 0.1076 0.0101 0.0904 0.1177
GDP Growth 0.0783 0.0671 0.2194 −0.0017
Inflation 5.2010 3.0371 11.4177 2.0035
Ln(Z) 65.6736 45.3562 170.3914 12.1619
LLP/TL 0.0050 0.0031 0.0108 0.0004
ROA 0.0050 0.0031 0.0108 0.0004
Total Asset Growth 0.0122 0.0157 0.0451 −0.0112
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A.2.7 Dominican Republic
Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Dominican Republic
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco BDI, S.A.
TA/C 0.0713 0.0476 0 0.0979
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z) 206.6817 35.0711 239.5799 169.7811
LLP/TL 0.0107 0.0025 0.0131 0.0075
ROA 0.0107 0.0025 0.0131 0.0075
Total Asset Growth 0.0040 0.0035 0.0080 0.0015
Banco de Ahorro y Credito Union, S.A.
TA/C −0.1534 0.6583 −1.5079 0.9058
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z) 47.9361 11.4759 60.6378 38.3149
LLP/TL 0.0198 0.0283 0.0820 −0.0165
ROA 0.0198 0.0283 0.0820 −0.0165
Total Asset Growth 0.0343 0.0583 0.1347 −0.0531
Banco de Nueva Escocia
TA/C 0.1951 0.0155 0.1561 0.2083
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z) 70.6198 74.4675 218.1364 23.3274
LLP/TL 0.0193 0.0084 0.0378 0.0118
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Table A.8 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0193 0.0084 0.0378 0.0118
Total Asset Growth 0.0032 0.0033 0.0097 0.0002
Banco Banco de Reservas de la Republica Dominicana
TA/C 0.0698 0.0048 0.0639 0.0818
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z) 56.5840 86.7261 316.7565 16.1299
LLP/TL 0.0146 0.0031 0.0199 0.0093
ROA 0.0146 0.0031 0.0199 0.0093
Total Asset Growth 0.0054 0.0036 0.0102 −0.0010
Banco Dominicano del Progreso
TA/C 0.0908 0.0169 0.0690 0.1123
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z) 38.7457 46.6992 162.3236 9.4671
LLP/TL 0.0101 0.0046 0.0152 0.0012
ROA 0.0101 0.0046 0.0152 0.0012
Total Asset Growth 0.0046 0.0055 0.0134 −0.0032
Banco Multiple BHD Leon, S.A.
TA/C 0.0758 0.0588 0 0.1200
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z) 253.9711 387.0575 928.0774 8.5040
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Table A.8 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0236 0.0022 0.0264 0.0209
ROA 0.0236 0.0022 0.0264 0.0209
Total Asset Growth 0.0080 0.0090 0.0234 0.0003
Banca Multiple Santa Cruz
TA/C 0.0990 0.0108 0.0842 0.1189
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z) 55.6009 79.4803 257.0538 15.6998
LLP/TL 0.0157 0.0048 0.0255 0.0073
ROA 0.0157 0.0048 0.0255 0.0073
Total Asset Growth 0.0121 0.0042 0.0184 0.0069
Banco Popular Dominicano, S.A. Banca Multiple
TA/C 0.0957 0.0079 0.0856 0.1070
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z) 123.8715 71.0524 228.6914 23.8363
LLP/TL 0.0183 0.0015 0.0210 0.0168
ROA 0.0183 0.0015 0.0210 0.0168
Total Asset Growth 0.0045 0.0014 0.0070 0.0033
Banco Vimenca S.A.
TA/C 0.3605 0.0872 0.1875 0.4208
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
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Table A.8 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 22.6653 12.9202 38.6885 4.2498
LLP/TL 0.0248 0.0119 0.0459 0.0094
ROA 0.0248 0.0119 0.0459 0.0094
Total Asset Growth 0.0179 0.0213 0.0550 0.0023
Citibank
TA/C 0.1606 0.0325 0.1376 0.1836
GDP Growth 0.0574 0.0303 0.1159 0.0018
Inflation 4.4162 2.9065 10.3917 0.6408
Ln(Z)
LLP/TL 0.0364 0.0163 0.0480 0.0249
ROA 0.0364 0.0163 0.0480 0.0249
Total Asset Growth −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0006
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A.2.8 Ecuador
Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Ecuador
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco Bolivariano
TA/C 0.0861 0.0047 0.0794 0.0936
GDP Growth 0.0728 0.0678 0.2108 −0.0239
Inflation 3.8745 4.2240 13.8473 −2.4910
Ln(Z) 33.4138 14.5766 60.0182 20.8397
LLP/TL 0.0116 0.0029 0.0175 0.0067
ROA 0.0116 0.0029 0.0175 0.0067
Total Asset Growth 0.0138 0.0108 0.0284 −0.0085
Banco de Guayaquil
TA/C 0.0994 0.0121 0.0808 0.1134
GDP Growth 0.0728 0.0678 0.2108 −0.0239
Inflation 3.8745 4.2240 13.8473 −2.4910
Ln(Z) 39.1876 20.0290 76.7869 10.2462
LLP/TL 0.0115 0.0088 0.0307 −0.0014
ROA 0.0115 0.0088 0.0307 −0.0014
Total Asset Growth 0.0091 0.0097 0.0203 −0.0156
Banco de la Produccion Produbanco
TA/C 0.0837 0.0047 0.0753 0.0881
GDP Growth 0.0728 0.0678 0.2108 −0.0239
Inflation 3.8745 4.2240 13.8473 −2.4910
Ln(Z) 72.7166 56.2758 156.2152 10.0167
LLP/TL 0.0098 0.0027 0.0141 0.0066
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Table A.9 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0098 0.0027 0.0141 0.0066
Total Asset Growth 0.0053 0.0063 0.0117 −0.0065
Banco Mutualista Pichincha
TA/C 0.0970 0.0067 0.0848 0.1092
GDP Growth 0.0728 0.0678 0.2108 −0.0239
Inflation 3.8745 4.2240 13.8473 −2.4910
Ln(Z) −5.5579 29.7887 30.8511 −62.8535
LLP/TL 0.0106 0.0052 0.0225 0.0049
ROA 0.0106 0.0052 0.0225 0.0049
Total Asset Growth 0.0112 0.0154 0.0444 −0.0130
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A.2.9 Guatemala
Table A.10: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Guatemala
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco Promerica de Guatemala
TA/C 0.1932 0.0641 0.1212 0.2814
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
Ln(Z) 27.0120 15.7068 50.0084 8.0200
LLP/TL 0.0214 0.0123 0.0399 0.0098
ROA 0.0214 0.0123 0.0399 0.0098
Total Asset Growth 0.0142 0.0469 0.1070 −0.0268
BAC Reformador
TA/C 0.1189 0.0209 0.0942 0.1450
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
Ln(Z) 80.3472 36.9155 140.4834 48.1046
LLP/TL 0.0189 0.0113 0.0332 0.0032
ROA 0.0189 0.0113 0.0332 0.0032
Total Asset Growth 0.0375 0.0525 0.1433 0.0070
Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala, S.A.
TA/C 0.1012 0.0094 0.0897 0.1181
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
Ln(Z) 397.0611 707.1325 1655.1663 37.2056
LLP/TL 0.0100 0.0025 0.0129 0.0057
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Table A.10 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0100 0.0025 0.0129 0.0057
Total Asset Growth 0.0114 0.0096 0.0284 0.0045
Banco de Guatemala
TA/C 0.0777 0.0106 0.0689 0.0967
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
Ln(Z) 79.0132 51.9008 168.0055 31.3779
LLP/TL 0.0148 0.0010 0.0156 0.0129
ROA 0.0148 0.0010 0.0156 0.0129
Total Asset Growth 0.0099 0.0030 0.0131 0.0065
Banco Promerica de los Trabajadores
TA/C 0.1091 0.0111 0.0922 0.1220
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
Ln(Z) 38.3108 17.8418 55.8193 7.4064
LLP/TL 0.0216 0.0028 0.0249 0.0170
ROA 0.0216 0.0028 0.0249 0.0170
Total Asset Growth 0.0187 0.0067 0.0258 0.0111
Banco G y T Continental
TA/C 0.0838 0.0052 0.0764 0.0916
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
Ln(Z) 226.6392 164.9995 444.9374 54.3636
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Table A.10 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0118 0.0017 0.0148 0.0101
ROA 0.0118 0.0017 0.0148 0.0101
Total Asset Growth 0.0051 0.0185 0.0339 −0.0170
Banco Internacional, S.A.
TA/C 0.0921 0.0050 0.0871 0.0973
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
Ln(Z) 89.5756 77.5770 219.0181 13.6215
LLP/TL 0.0147 0.0009 0.0160 0.0136
ROA 0.0147 0.0009 0.0160 0.0136
Total Asset Growth 0.0157 0.0026 0.0194 0.0135
Banrural, S.A.
TA/C 0.1149 0.0016 0.1130 0.1168
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
Ln(Z) 44.6590 9.6045 56.5034 36.1743
LLP/TL 0.0180 0.0040 0.0236 0.0144
ROA 0.0180 0.0040 0.0236 0.0144
Total Asset Growth 0.0114 0.0036 0.0155 0.0058
El Credito Hiotecario Nacional de Guatemala
TA/C 0.0593 0.0156 0.0444 0.0846
GDP Growth 0.0798 0.0515 0.1528 −0.0358
Inflation 4.3864 2.0459 9.4407 2.9375
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Table A.10 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 75.0344 65.3609 172.2405 33.3177
LLP/TL 0.0039 0.0010 0.0051 0.0029
ROA 0.0039 0.0010 0.0051 0.0029
Total Asset Growth 0.0095 0.0105 0.0224 −0.0025
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A.2.10 Honduras
Table A.11: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Honduras
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco del Pais
TA/C 0.1028 0.0147 0.0774 0.1233
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 85.7764 56.2270 218.1380 38.3949
LLP/TL 0.0155 0.0018 0.0176 0.0130
ROA 0.0155 0.0018 0.0176 0.0130
Total Asset Growth 0.0112 0.0048 0.0169 0.0039
Banco Atlantida
TA/C 0.0991 0.0429 0.0207 0.1810
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 53.9607 46.7653 122.0724 19.6417
LLP/TL 0.0104 0.0015 0.0118 0.0071
ROA 0.0104 0.0015 0.0118 0.0071
Total Asset Growth 0.0092 0.0027 0.0122 0.0046
Banco Davivienda Honduras
TA/C 0.1119 0.0095 0.0961 0.1251
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 130.2372 85.2719 233.6930 32.5331
LLP/TL 0.0113 0.0041 0.0176 0.0054
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Table A.11 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0113 0.0041 0.0176 0.0054
Total Asset Growth −0.0014 0.0251 0.0158 −0.0549
Banco de America Central Honduras BAC Bamer
TA/C 0.1333 0.0207 0.1185 0.1917
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 123.5167 140.6609 420.8838 24.4331
LLP/TL 0.0259 0.0029 0.0311 0.0216
ROA 0.0259 0.0029 0.0311 0.0216
Total Asset Growth 0.0141 0.0180 0.0477 −0.0226
Banco de Desarrollo Rural Honduras, S.A.
TA/C 0.1320 0.0569 0.0659 0.2042
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 89.2712 85.0189 253.5704 17.2546
LLP/TL −0.0080 0.0135 0.0061 −0.0254
ROA −0.0080 0.0135 0.0061 −0.0254
Total Asset Growth 0.0675 0.1252 0.3474 −0.0059
Banco de Occidente, S.A.
TA/C 0.1024 0.0192 0.0581 0.1252
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 101.6679 43.5960 140.4926 48.3030
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Table A.11 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0144 0.0024 0.0189 0.0108
ROA 0.0144 0.0024 0.0189 0.0108
Total Asset Growth 0.0096 0.0097 0.0251 −0.0096
Banco Financiera Centroamericana, S.A.
TA/C 0.1143 0.0075 0.1021 0.1254
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 135.7872 86.8983 268.0218 31.7998
LLP/TL 0.0101 0.0024 0.0144 0.0068
ROA 0.0101 0.0024 0.0144 0.0068
Total Asset Growth 0.0080 0.0099 0.0218 −0.0065
Banco Financiera Comercial Hondurena, S.A.
TA/C 0.1236 0.0173 0.1063 0.1473
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 52.2931 23.4867 73.3157 5.6681
LLP/TL 0.0038 0.0014 0.0056 0.0021
ROA 0.0038 0.0014 0.0056 0.0021
Total Asset Growth −0.0097 0.0408 0.0153 −0.0568
Banco Laifse (Honduras)
TA/C 0.0748 0.0118 0.0589 0.0869
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
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Table A.11 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 72.3131 33.7749 98.3695 5.9185
LLP/TL 0.0048 0.0035 0.0102 0.0008
ROA 0.0048 0.0035 0.0102 0.0008
Total Asset Growth 0.0065 0.0112 0.0238 −0.0119
Banco Promerica Honduras
TA/C 0.0944 0.0159 0.0595 0.1136
GDP Growth 0.0626 0.0364 0.1234 −0.0015
Inflation 5.1395 2.3948 7.8072 1.3740
Ln(Z) 67.1741 50.3849 178.2866 36.3875
LLP/TL 0.0128 0.0034 0.0178 0.0082
ROA 0.0128 0.0034 0.0178 0.0082
Total Asset Growth 0.0188 0.0140 0.0434 0.0016
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A.2.11 Mexico
Table A.12: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Mexico
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco del Pais
Banco Inbursa
TA/C 0.2464 0.0231 0.2158 0.2913
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
Ln(Z) 63.3809 52.7205 183.6513 4.2255
LLP/TL 0.0308 0.0103 0.0469 0.0153
ROA 0.0308 0.0103 0.0469 0.0153
Total Asset Growth 0.0075 0.0205 0.0553 −0.0202
Banco Interacciones
TA/C 0.0618 0.0113 0.0407 0.0803
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
Ln(Z) 72.6486 38.6864 126.5935 19.2524
LLP/TL 0.0115 0.0015 0.0142 0.0091
ROA 0.0115 0.0015 0.0142 0.0091
Total Asset Growth 0.0146 0.0238 0.0701 −0.0155
Banco Mercantil del Norte
TA/C 0.0888 0.0146 0.0640 0.1118
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
Ln(Z) 66.6220 31.3909 106.5991 19.9967
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Table A.12 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0140 0.0033 0.0210 0.0093
ROA 0.0140 0.0033 0.0210 0.0093
Total Asset Growth 0.0079 0.0236 0.0689 −0.0202
Banco Nacional de Mexico
TA/C 0.1446 0.0232 0.1270 0.2121
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
Ln(Z) 68.3277 58.5776 170.3556 14.0447
LLP/TL 0.0159 0.0030 0.0197 0.0117
ROA 0.0159 0.0030 0.0197 0.0117
Total Asset Growth 0.0021 0.0122 0.0309 −0.0163
Banco Santander de Mexico
TA/C 0.1077 0.0171 0.0796 0.1304
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
Ln(Z) 73.1477 40.4499 136.2524 26.4919
LLP/TL 0.0176 0.0055 0.0254 0.0114
ROA 0.0176 0.0055 0.0254 0.0114
Total Asset Growth 0.0058 0.0197 0.0492 −0.0327
Banco Mext
TA/C 0.0614 0.0078 0.0462 0.0768
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
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Table A.12 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 61.7788 57.3354 216.6607 21.5320
LLP/TL 0.0015 0.0061 0.0055 −0.0161
ROA 0.0015 0.0061 0.0055 −0.0161
Total Asset Growth 0.0106 0.0191 0.0448 −0.0183
Deustche Bank Mexico, S.A.
TA/C 0.1094 0.0135 0.0959 0.1275
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
Ln(Z) 36.0369 19.8774 79.9688 19.3461
LLP/TL 0.0123 0.0048 0.0227 0.0075
ROA 0.0123 0.0048 0.0227 0.0075
Total Asset Growth 0.0086 0.0106 0.0243 −0.0099
HSBC Mexico
TA/C 0.0779 0.0269 0 0.1022
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
Ln(Z) 73.6257 47.8667 143.7459 11.8448
LLP/TL 0.0032 0.0030 0.0082 −0.0012
ROA 0.0032 0.0030 0.0082 −0.0012
Total Asset Growth 0.0023 0.0156 0.0201 −0.0290
Scotiabank Inverlat, S.A.
TA/C 0.1255 0.0251 0.0947 0.1603
GDP Growth 0.0190 0.1054 0.1753 −0.1891
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Table A.12 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Inflation 4.6120 1.5233 6.7608 1.5297
Ln(Z) 52.3653 56.4315 176.0583 1.1377
LLP/TL 0.0146 0.0027 0.0196 0.0115
ROA 0.0146 0.0027 0.0196 0.0115
Total Asset Growth 0.0074 0.0112 0.0179 −0.0162
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A.2.12 Panama
Table A.13: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Panama
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
BAC International Bank
TA/C 0.1126 0.0066 0.1015 0.1196
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 60.5256 50.2795 120.0067 12.4727
LLP/TL 0.0207 0.0047 0.0325 0.0171
ROA 0.0207 0.0047 0.0325 0.0171
Total Asset Growth 0.0122 0.0081 0.0308 0.0023
Banco General, S.A.
TA/C 0.1100 0.0370 0 0.1316
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 45.3201 24.5295 92.4977 12.8852
LLP/TL 0.0234 0.0008 0.0245 0.0222
ROA 0.0234 0.0008 0.0245 0.0222
Total Asset Growth 0.0092 0.0037 0.0141 0.0032
Banco Latinoamericano de Comercio Exterior, S.A.
TA/C 0.1354 0.0217 0.1135 0.1831
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 290.3955 473.4112 1686.5661 52.9138
LLP/TL 0.0114 0.0037 0.0144 0.0015
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Table A.13 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0114 0.0037 0.0144 0.0015
Total Asset Growth 0.0029 0.0096 0.0181 −0.0090
Banco Nacional de Panama, S.A.
TA/C −0.0309 0.3698 −1.1457 0.0910
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 221.1501 182.0615 621.9565 30.5587
LLP/TL 0.0171 0.0072 0.0364 0.0105
ROA 0.0171 0.0072 0.0364 0.0105
Total Asset Growth 0.0078 0.0468 0.1206 −0.0841
Bancolombia (Panama)
TA/C 0.0989 0.0242 0.0617 0.1317
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 76.9222 39.9554 142.4147 36.8802
LLP/TL 0.0115 0.0134 0.0346 −0.0189
ROA 0.0115 0.0134 0.0346 −0.0189
Total Asset Growth −0.0192 0.1021 0.0377 −0.3248
Banesco
TA/C 0.0890 0.0124 0.0704 0.1123
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 146.0935 142.7878 467.7941 3.1551
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Table A.13 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0134 0.0041 0.0194 0.0080
ROA 0.0134 0.0041 0.0194 0.0080
Total Asset Growth 0.0981 0.2422 0.8264 0.0010
Banistmo
TA/C 0.1120 0.0039 0.1062 0.1165
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 29.0485 56.0098 127.0543 −88.5120
LLP/TL 0.0096 0.0029 0.0141 0.0050
ROA 0.0096 0.0029 0.0141 0.0050
Total Asset Growth 0.0021 0.0048 0.0078 −0.0054
Caja de Ahorros
TA/C 0.1113 0.0125 0.0952 0.1314
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 203.2451 301.4747 1023.7132 3.5450
LLP/TL 0.0100 0.0047 0.0157 0.0011
ROA 0.0100 0.0047 0.0157 0.0011
Total Asset Growth 0.0164 0.0105 0.0414 0.0049
Global Bank Corporation
TA/C 0.0844 0.0111 0.0632 0.1036
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
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Table A.13 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 39.1610 20.5239 70.7395 0.3234
LLP/TL 0.0070 0.0020 0.0105 0.0035
ROA 0.0070 0.0020 0.0105 0.0035
Total Asset Growth 0.0195 0.0092 0.0326 0.0025
Multibank
TA/C 0.1024 0.0048 0.0935 0.1101
GDP Growth 0.1078 0.0476 0.1813 0.0445
Inflation 4.1497 2.2626 7.5275 0.7451
Ln(Z) 79.8954 118.5592 372.8182 5.1789
LLP/TL 0.0128 0.0009 0.0142 0.0116
ROA 0.0128 0.0009 0.0142 0.0116
Total Asset Growth 0.0184 0.0081 0.0283 0.0050
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A.2.13 Paraguay
Table A.14: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Paraguay
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco Atlas
TA/C 0.1157 0.0149 0.1049 0.1515
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 58.0809 23.1451 92.6651 34.7848
LLP/TL 0.0179 0.0105 0.0256 0.0010
ROA 0.0179 0.0105 0.0256 0.0010
Total Asset Growth 0.0646 0.1127 0.3169 0.0048
Banco Continental
TA/C 0.4998 0.4297 0.1565 1.0556
GDP Growth 0.1634 0.2352 0.5975 −0.1580
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 74.0595 64.4428 163.1179 13.3357
LLP/TL 0.0133 0.0102 0.0239 0.0023
ROA 0.0133 0.0102 0.0239 0.0023
Total Asset Growth 0.0248 0.0292 0.0779 −0.0133
Banco GNB Paraguay
TA/C 0.1101 0.0164 0.0884 0.1357
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 35.5145 18.8699 63.8191 3.2289
LLP/TL 0.0180 0.0034 0.0215 0.0125
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Table A.14 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0180 0.0034 0.0215 0.0125
Total Asset Growth 0.0102 0.0058 0.0171 0.0046
Banco Itau Paraguay
TA/C 0.1310 0.0129 0.1108 0.1497
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 1371.2723 3878.6822 12 402.1631 9.8996
LLP/TL 0.0381 0.0043 0.0450 0.0319
ROA 0.0381 0.0043 0.0450 0.0319
Total Asset Growth 0.0158 0.0244 0.0620 −0.0062
Banco Nacional de Fomento
TA/C 0.1501 0.0339 0.0769 0.1771
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 46.9824 36.7393 119.7848 5.7572
LLP/TL 0.0245 0.0123 0.0434 0.0025
ROA 0.0245 0.0123 0.0434 0.0025
Total Asset Growth 0.0197 0.0164 0.0386 −0.0102
Banco Regional S.A.E.C.A.
TA/C 0.0967 0.0181 0.0781 0.1306
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 88.2412 115.4225 406.8707 15.4957
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Table A.14 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0072 0.0062 0.0157 0.0004
ROA 0.0072 0.0062 0.0157 0.0004
Total Asset Growth 0.0281 0.0393 0.1220 −0.0130
BBVA Paraguay
TA/C 0.0928 0.0103 0.0737 0.1135
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 94.1596 44.9091 186.4141 43.0047
LLP/TL 0.0226 0.0138 0.0493 0.0099
ROA 0.0226 0.0138 0.0493 0.0099
Total Asset Growth 0.0160 0.0261 0.0665 −0.0177
Citibank Paraguay
TA/C 0.1003 0.0360 0 0.1311
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 165.7686 204.8018 562.8681 10.7228
LLP/TL 0.0119 0.0114 0.0334 −0.0011
ROA 0.0119 0.0114 0.0334 −0.0011
Total Asset Growth −0.0002 0.0237 0.0363 −0.0293
SUDAMERIS BANK S.A.E.C.A.
TA/C 0.1008 0.0205 0.0796 0.1497
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
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Table A.14 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 51.6748 43.2937 140.1001 12.0496
LLP/TL 0.0160 0.0048 0.0248 0.0103
ROA 0.0160 0.0048 0.0248 0.0103
Total Asset Growth 0.0198 0.0215 0.0630 −0.0085
Vision Banco S.A.E.C.A.
TA/C 0.0906 0.0102 0.0771 0.1112
GDP Growth 0.0870 0.1477 0.3764 −0.1021
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 61.1750 59.5286 200.4245 10.0750
LLP/TL 0.0124 0.0063 0.0210 0.0027
ROA 0.0124 0.0063 0.0210 0.0027
Total Asset Growth 0.0377 0.0490 0.1511 −0.0138
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A.2.14 Peru
Table A.15: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Peru
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco Continental
TA/C 0.4998 0.4297 0.1565 1.0556
GDP Growth 0.1634 0.2352 0.5975 −0.1580
Inflation 4.4136 2.8133 12.1939 1.6048
Ln(Z) 74.0595 64.4428 163.1179 13.3357
LLP/TL 0.0133 0.0102 0.0239 0.0023
ROA 0.0133 0.0102 0.0239 0.0023
Total Asset Growth 0.0248 0.0292 0.0779 −0.0133
Banco de Credito del Peru
TA/C 0.1585 0.2174 0.0781 0.8128
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
Ln(Z) 192.9801 310.8595 881.1748 10.4415
LLP/TL 0.0180 0.0052 0.0235 0.0049
ROA 0.0180 0.0052 0.0235 0.0049
Total Asset Growth −0.0012 0.0494 0.0436 −0.1425
Banco Financiero
TA/C 0.0860 0.0106 0.0717 0.1114
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
Ln(Z) 42.7913 44.3256 132.9733 5.6032
LLP/TL 0.0113 0.0065 0.0210 0.0024
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Table A.15 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0113 0.0065 0.0210 0.0024
Total Asset Growth 0.0274 0.1566 0.4355 −0.2467
Banco Interamericano de Finanzas
TA/C 0.0729 0.0079 0.0536 0.0862
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
Ln(Z) 88.2410 81.0772 256.9988 12.3392
LLP/TL 0.0106 0.0024 0.0138 0.0070
ROA 0.0106 0.0024 0.0138 0.0070
Total Asset Growth 0.0179 0.0154 0.0530 −0.0050
Banco Internacional del Peru
TA/C 0.0927 0.0127 0.0642 0.1126
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
Ln(Z) 119.9204 96.5595 365.1546 33.1613
LLP/TL 0.0226 0.0028 0.0270 0.0185
ROA 0.0226 0.0028 0.0270 0.0185
Total Asset Growth 0.0153 0.0167 0.0540 −0.0049
Banco Santander Peru, S.A.
TA/C 0.0942 0.0205 0.0672 0.1284
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
Ln(Z) 49.0324 36.2133 99.0412 8.7199
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Table A.15 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0075 0.0079 0.0146 −0.0110
ROA 0.0075 0.0079 0.0146 −0.0110
Total Asset Growth 0.0640 0.1316 0.4517 −0.0161
Citibank del Peru
TA/C 0.1427 0.0310 0.0996 0.1999
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
Ln(Z) 21.0983 16.9504 51.3266 4.4624
LLP/TL 0.0195 0.0130 0.0495 0.0061
ROA 0.0195 0.0130 0.0495 0.0061
Total Asset Growth 0.0097 0.0241 0.0567 −0.0229
HSBC Bank Peru, S.A.
TA/C 0.1042 0.0177 0.0784 0.1284
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
Ln(Z) 64.4471 78.6226 252.4720 7.3090
LLP/TL −0.0035 0.0147 0.0100 −0.0301
ROA −0.0035 0.0147 0.0100 −0.0301
Total Asset Growth 0.0257 0.0407 0.1182 −0.0110
Mi Banco
TA/C 0.1117 0.0193 0.0846 0.1380
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
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Table A.15 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Ln(Z) 101.5459 81.4845 265.3396 25.4235
LLP/TL 0.0191 0.0134 0.0348 −0.0118
ROA 0.0191 0.0134 0.0348 −0.0118
Total Asset Growth 0.0248 0.0311 0.0918 −0.0119
Scotiabank Peru
TA/C 0.1283 0.0135 0.1010 0.1466
GDP Growth 0.0764 0.0875 0.2210 −0.0558
Inflation 2.8909 1.8421 6.7458 1.0572
Ln(Z) 170.6435 185.4473 512.0992 25.1580
LLP/TL 0.0229 0.0031 0.0277 0.0177
ROA 0.0229 0.0031 0.0277 0.0177
Total Asset Growth 0.0124 0.0163 0.0466 −0.0106
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A.2.15 Puerto Rico
Table A.16: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Puerto Rico
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
TA/C 0.1125 0.0214 0.0731 0.1428
GDP Growth 0 0 0 0
Inflation 0 0 0 0
Ln(Z) 75.5169 52.1530 171.5394 28.6943
LLP/TL 0.0052 0.0098 0.0250 −0.0095
ROA 0.0052 0.0098 0.0250 −0.0095
Total Asset Growth 0.0004 0.0053 0.0078 −0.0075
Oriental Bank
TA/C 0.1157 0.0313 0.0504 0.1527
GDP Growth 0 0 0 0
Inflation 0 0 0 0
Ln(Z) 116.0447 139.6461 452.3369 9.0246
LLP/TL 0.0070 0.0051 0.0127 −0.0005
ROA 0.0070 0.0051 0.0127 −0.0005
Total Asset Growth 7.0446 × 10−5 0.0090 0.0202 −0.0075
hline
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A.2.16 Uruguay
Table A.17: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Puerto Rico
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco de la Republica de Uruguay
TA/C 0.0897 0.0093 0.0815 0.1074
GDP Growth 0.0941 0.1166 0.2971 −0.0692
Inflation 7.4904 1.6822 9.3722 4.7064
Ln(Z) 14.0293 11.3877 36.3354 7.0187
LLP/TL 0.0144 0.0071 0.0265 0.0046
ROA 0.0144 0.0071 0.0265 0.0046
Total Asset Growth 0.0060 0.0070 0.0164 −0.0056
Banco Hipotecario de Uruguay
TA/C 0.4500 0.0193 0.4111 0.4666
GDP Growth 0.0941 0.1166 0.2971 −0.0692
Inflation 7.4904 1.6822 9.3722 4.7064
Ln(Z) 21.8739 17.2261 48.0362 6.4666
LLP/TL 0.0286 0.0177 0.0490 0.0020
ROA 0.0286 0.0177 0.0490 0.0020
Total Asset Growth 0.0068 0.0105 0.0215 −0.0064
Banco Itau de Uruguay
TA/C 0.0828 0.0113 0.0641 0.1011
GDP Growth 0.0941 0.1166 0.2971 −0.0692
Inflation 7.4904 1.6822 9.3722 4.7064
Ln(Z) 22.0253 7.7554 31.8777 13.7920
LLP/TL 0.0162 0.0072 0.0264 0.0030
138
Table A.17 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0162 0.0072 0.0264 0.0030
Total Asset Growth 0.0113 0.0201 0.0500 −0.0086
Banco Santander Uruguay
TA/C 0.0793 0.0074 0.0714 0.0888
GDP Growth 0.0941 0.1166 0.2971 −0.0692
Inflation 7.4904 1.6822 9.3722 4.7064
Ln(Z) 31.5206 21.1715 66.5142 8.0956
LLP/TL 0.0075 0.0052 0.0157 0.0027
ROA 0.0075 0.0052 0.0157 0.0027
Total Asset Growth 0.0024 0.0091 0.0159 −0.0114
Citibank N.A. Uruguay
TA/C 0.0637 0.0033 0.0591 0.0680
GDP Growth 0.0941 0.1166 0.2971 −0.0692
Inflation 7.4904 1.6822 9.3722 4.7064
Ln(Z) 161.0443 303.8022 704.2236 14.9388
LLP/TL 0.0111 0.0108 0.0276 0.0014
ROA 0.0111 0.0108 0.0276 0.0014
Total Asset Growth −0.0055 0.0265 0.0250 −0.0300
HSBC Bank Urugay, S.A.
TA/C 0.0600 0.0052 0.0550 0.0700
GDP Growth 0.0941 0.1166 0.2971 −0.0692
Inflation 7.4904 1.6822 9.3722 4.7064
Ln(Z) 72.9830 91.9209 254.4106 23.8958
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Table A.17 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0010 0.0052 0.0068 −0.0063
ROA 0.0010 0.0052 0.0068 −0.0063
Total Asset Growth 0.0007 0.0237 0.0291 −0.0317
Scotiabank Uruguay
TA/C 0.0637 0.0076 0.0506 0.0718
GDP Growth 0.0941 0.1166 0.2971 −0.0692
Inflation 7.4904 1.6822 9.3722 4.7064
Ln(Z) 37.7036 34.2125 102.7834 11.7989
LLP/TL 0.0003 0.0041 0.0056 −0.0050
ROA 0.0003 0.0041 0.0056 −0.0050
Total Asset Growth 0.0141 0.0326 0.0735 −0.0248
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A.2.17 Venezuela
Table A.18: Descriptive Statistics for Banks in Venezuela
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
Banco del Caribe
TA/C 0 0 0 0
GDP Growth 0 0 0 0
Inflation
Ln(Z) 11.2463 121.1520 162.4321 −330.9750
LLP/TL 0.0243 0.0083 0.0321 0.0099
ROA 0.0243 0.0083 0.0321 0.0099
Total Asset Growth 0.0593 0.0501 0.1455 −0.0056
Banco Mercantil Venezuela
TA/C 0.1596 0.2967 0.0006 0.9993
GDP Growth 0 0
Inflation 0 0
Ln(Z) 21.6882 13.2033 45.0296 9.2481
LLP/TL 0.0325 0.0330 0.1224 0.0079
ROA 0.0325 0.0330 0.1224 0.0079
Total Asset Growth 0.0236 0.1792 0.2369 −0.4038
Banco Nacional de Credito
TA/C 0.0264 0.2794 −0.7488 0.2739
GDP Growth
Inflation
Ln(Z) 59.3113 135.3244 419.5896 4.3127
LLP/TL 0.0341 0.0174 0.0543 0.0089
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Table A.18 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
ROA 0.0341 0.0174 0.0543 0.0089
Total Asset Growth 0.0095 0.1904 0.2746 −0.4398
Banco Venezolano de Credito
TA/C 0.0952 0.0359 0.0238 0.1237
GDP Growth 0 0
Inflation 0 0
Ln(Z) 16.6712 22.8480 74.6310 1.9527
LLP/TL 0.0382 0.0202 0.0543 0.0008
ROA 0.0382 0.0202 0.0543 0.0008
Total Asset Growth 0.0155 0.0352 0.0584 −0.0398
Banesco, S.A.
TA/C 0.0718 0.0179 0.0280 0.0848
GDP Growth 0 0
Inflation 0 0
Ln(Z) 29.7561 24.0823 67.5467 7.8301
LLP/TL 0.0252 0.0144 0.0478 1.6288 × 10−7
ROA 0.0252 0.0144 0.0478 1.6288 × 10−7
Total Asset Growth 0.0344 0.0739 0.2094 −0.1033
BBVA Banco Provincial, S.A.
TA/C 0.0967 0.0509 0.0239 0.2282
GDP Growth 0 0
Inflation 0 0
Ln(Z) 15.6034 8.8159 31.1832 4.0978
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Table A.18 Continued
Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum
LLP/TL 0.0338 0.0116 0.0463 0.0111
ROA 0.0338 0.0116 0.0463 0.0111
Total Asset Growth 0.0364 0.0606 0.1853 −0.0650
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